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67 
THE MYTH OF MENTAL DISORDER: 
TRANSSUBSTANTIVE BEHAVIOR AND TAXOMETRIC 
PSYCHIATRY 
Steven K. Erickson* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1961, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz wrote what would become one 
of the most controversial books in psychiatry that directly questioned 
whether traditional concepts of mental illnesses existed.  The Myth of 
Mental Illness1 claimed that while psychiatry openly held mental 
illnesses as diseases under the rubric of the medical model,2 they really 
were mere arbitrary descriptions of behaviors that the profession itself 
had proclaimed to be illnesses.  Szasz argued that since there were no 
identified lesions in the brain that could be attributed to mental illnesses, 
there was no evidence of disease.3  Without disease, mental disorders 
were not illnesses as traditionally understood in medicine.4  
Consequently, mental illnesses were theoretical formulations describing 
behaviors that were declared by the profession as abnormal rather than 
 
* MIRECC Fellow, Yale University; Adjunct Professor of Psychiatry, University of Rochester 
Medical Center.  J.D., (SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY). L.L.M., (Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 
MA). Ph.D., (SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY).  This paper was prepared for the Yale University 
School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. Special thanks to Bill Stuntz, Michael Perlin, Chuck 
Ewing, Jeff Rachlinski, Christopher Slobogin Steve Lamberti, Michelle Erickson and Patricia 
Erickson for comments and thoughtful discussions. 
 1. THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF 
PERSONAL CONDUCT (1961). 
 2. Generally, the medical model holds these tenets: (1) sufficient deviation from the normal 
results in disease; (2) disease is due to known or unknown natural causes; (3) elimination of these 
causes will result in a cue or improvement for the patient. See, George L. Engel, The Need for a 
New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine, 196 SCI. 129 (1977) (describing the traditional 
medical model and calling for a new model that would become known as the biopsychosocial 
model). 
 3. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 72. Szasz argues that the absence of mental illnesses in anatomy, 
biochemistry, and physiology textbooks suggests that they are not of biological origin. 
 4. Id. 
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based upon any empirically discovered finding.5 As such, mental 
illnesses, according to Szasz, were inherently, culturally, and socially 
bound and open to manipulation by the dominant social class.6  Thus, the 
professional formulations of mental illnesses were inherently a form of 
social control whereby society classified as mentally ill those with 
socially undesirable behavior.  As Szasz famously put it, “[i]f you talk to 
God, society calls it praying; if God talks to you, society calls you 
schizophrenic.”7 
Of course, Szasz’s claim was made at a time when there was much 
social change occurring in America and elsewhere.  The 1960s was a 
time when many questioned long held political and social values, 
especially values that reinforced authority figures.8  What was once 
considered immutable social tradition was placed on its head.  Many 
argued that social norms really were methods of social control that 
benefited the upper-class.9  Simultaneously, the monolithic state 
institutions that once held (often for life) hundreds of thousands of 
mentally ill citizens were a dying epoch as the deinstitutionalization 
movement led to community treatment as the predominate paradigm of 
psychiatric care.10  Coinciding with the civil rights movement, the 
migration of the mentally ill from state institutions to the community 
followed the emergent belief that individual autonomy was a 
fundamental right, and hence a Constitutional one, and should be 
zealously guarded among society’s disenfranchised: the poor, ethnic 
minorities, and the mentally ill.11 
 
 5. For a great review of Szasz’s arguments, see Eric J. Dammann, "The Myth of Mental 
Illness:" Continuing Controversies and Their Implications for Mental Health Professionals, 17 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 733, 734-37 (1997). 
 6. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 72. 
 7. THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE SECOND SIN 113 (1973). 
 8. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 75-94 (2001) (describing the shifting 
social and political climate in the United Kingdom and United States on penal philosophy during the 
late 20th century). 
 9. For an interesting empirical analysis of social class, protest, and the 1960s see Darren E. 
Sherkat & T. Jean Blocker, The Political Development of Sixties’ Activists: Identifying the Influence 
of Class, Gender, and Socialization on Protest Participation,  72 SOC. FORCES 821 (1994). 
 10. See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL 
ILLNESS CRISIS 8-11, 91-140 (1997). 
 11. Probably the most noted case that established personal autonomy (related to reproductive 
rights) as a "penumbra" of the Constitution is the Griswold case. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 483 (1965).  See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that the state 
cannot confine a nondangerous mentally ill person against their will); Rogers M. Smith, The 
Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 175-84 (1982) (reviewing the numerous Supreme 
Court decisions of the 1960s and 1970s that recognized a wide variety of Constitutional rights based 
on autonomy); KANT PATEL & MARK E. RUSHEFESKY, HEALTH CARE POLICY IN AN AGE OF NEW 
2
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Putting aside Szasz’s pronouncements, the reality of 
deinstitutionalization actually entailed the serendipitous discovery of 
effective medications in the 1950s that made community living possible 
for the mentally ill rather than any recognition of individual autonomy 
by society. Treatment, not acknowledged autonomy, was largely 
responsible for the transformation of crazy behavior into mere odd 
conduct that could be tolerated by society at large.12  And like so many 
social movements, other forces were in play that likely did more to 
hasten the exodus of the mentally ill from the state institutions.  The 
1960s saw the creation of Medicaid which specifically excluded 
payments to psychiatric patients in state institutions.13 Along with the 
enactment of the Community Mental Health Centers Act14 in 1963, 
which provided federal funding for community mental health treatment, 
the financial carrot was set by the government to end costly institutional 
care for the mentally ill.  As one noted psychiatrist put it, the stage was 
set for an unholy alliance between the political left who favored civil 
liberties and the political right who desired fiscal austerity that was to 
become the end of large-scale intuitional care irrespective of other 
concerns.15 
As the years progressed, it became obvious that the Pollyannaish 
hope that all of the institutionalized mentally ill could reintegrate back 
into society once the shackles of political oppression and psychiatric 
paternalism were thrown off was overly optimistic.16  As many 
 
TECHNOLOGIES 41 (2002) (discussing the influence of women’s, civil, and ethnic minorities’ rights 
movements during the 1960s on subsequent health law policy). 
 12. See William Gronfein, Psychotropic Drugs and the Origins of Deinstitutionalization, 32 
SOC. PROBS. 437 (1985).  Although Gronfein concludes that psychotropic drugs did not have a 
direct influence on discharge rates from state hospitals from the 1940s to 1980s, he also concludes 
that medications made deinstitutionalization politically and publicly viable; but see ANDREW 
SCULL, SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER (1989) for an argument that medications did have a 
direct effect on deinstitutionalization. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2004). The exclusion applies to inpatient psychiatric care for 
people aged 21-65. See Susan M. Jennen, The IMD Exclusion: A Discriminatory Denial of Medicaid 
Funding for Non-Elderly Adults in Institutions for Mental Disorders, 17 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. 
REV.  339, 340-49 (1991) (explaining the history of the inpatient psychiatric care exclusion despite 
a lack of a regulatory definition of “Institutions of Mental Diseases” (IMD) contained in 42 
U.S.C.A. §1396 until 1988). The exclusion has survived Constitutional challenge.  See Kantrowitz 
v. Weinberger, 430 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the IMD exclusion does not violate 
federal constitutional rights of due process or equal protection). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 2688 (1963), superseded by Pub. L. No. 94-63 § 66 (1975), and codified by 
42 U.S.C. § 246. 
 15. Interview with J. Richard Ciccone, Director of the Psychiatry and Law Program, 
University of Rochester, in Rochester, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2006). 
 16. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and 
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 377 (1982) ("[D]einstitutionalization harbored an idealized 
3
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advocates and mental health professionals proclaimed, there was the 
stark reality of the “obviously mentally ill” person who fervently 
believed his food was poisoned, his doctors guilty of implanting 
electronic probes in his genitals, and himself to be Jesus Christ despite 
the best intentions of community treatment.17  The growing number of 
the “obviously mentally ill” persons roaming the streets, often homeless, 
preoccupied with intruding thoughts of persecution and bizarre notions 
of grandiosity (that even the most sympathetic libertarian found 
unfathomable) mitigated against any purest Szaszian position.18  
Nevertheless, Szasz was onto something. If mental illnesses do indeed 
lack physical markers that can be observed in the laboratory (as we will 
see some do and some do not), then they are not discovered in an 
empirical sense but proclaimed (or invented as Szasz held) by 
established authorities.19  Then the questions naturally flow: Who 
decides what is a mental illness? How is mental illness defined?  How is 
one person determined to be mentally ill while others are not?  What 
Szasz’s thesis acknowledged was that “mental illness” had evolved over 
time and has been influenced as much by social and political factors as 
by science.20  As such, psychiatry’s decree that mental illnesses were 
illnesses on par with cancer or heart disease was faulty at best and a 
fraud at worst. 
Despite these concerns, the law has long recognized the existence 
and importance of mental illness.21  Blackstone held that prosecution of 
 
notion of ‘community’ and tended to exaggerate the extent to which labeling a person mentally ill 
produces and perpetuates pathology. Consequently, they were overly optimistic in their assessment 
of the ability of released patients to survive, unaided, in society.”); Alexander Gralnick, Build a 
Better State Hospital: Deinstitutionalization Has Failed, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 738 
(1985). 
 17. See Darold A. Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth 
Standard for Civil Commitment, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259 (1985). 
 18. See generally Rhoden, supra note 16, at 386-93; but see Michael L. Perlin, Competency, 
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991) 
(arguing that homelessness among persons with mental illness was more related to housing and 
economic factors than untreated illness). 
 19. See SZASZ, supra note 1, at 12; Drammann, supra note 5, at 734-37. Drammann explains 
that Szasz’s contention was that while science proved and discovered phenomena, psychiatry 
invented and declared behaviors as illnesses. 
 20. See Thomas S. Szasz, The Classification of "Mental Illness": A Situational Analysis of 
Psychiatric Operations, 33 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 77 (1959) (arguing that social and cultural systems 
invariably impact the development of psychiatric nosology). 
 21. See Derek Bolton, Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder', 51 THE PHIL. Q. 182, 
182-83 (2001) (discussing Locke’s conception of mental illness); Nigel Walker, The Insanity 
Defense Before 1800, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 25-26 (1985) (stating that the 
insanity defense dates back at least to the pre-Norman conquest of 1066 days); see generally ISSAC 
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY  (1871). 
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a “madman” was morally reprehensible since punishment was only just 
when the recipient of the punishment knew why he was being 
punished.22  Modern history shows that the law has rarely doubted the 
existence of mental illness, of madmen, but has struggled with its 
definition and its disposition.23  Thus, law and science both have a 
historical appreciation of madness, yet each understanding is rooted 
within its own epistemological history.  Law is a discipline of the 
humanities, based upon beliefs, arguments, and deduction.  Truth, in 
law, is derived not so much by production of observable phenomenon, 
but by persuasion and argument.  On the other hand, modern psychiatry 
posits itself as a natural science, based in empiricism, observation, and 
experimentation.  Science pursues truth by investing in verifiable 
theories that through consensus become established laws that explain 
material phenomenon. Yet this transformation is fairly recent, and old 
habits die hard.  Psychiatry’s growth from mainly treating 
institutionalized citizens to its psychoanalytical heyday of the 1950s 
 
 22. William Blackstone, Of the Persons Capable of Committing Crimes, in 4 COMMENTARIES 
2 (1769) (discussing the historical view of furious furore solum punitur (“madness alone punishes a 
madman”) and that madness as a deficiency of the will should stay the criminal prosecution at any 
time during a criminal proceeding, including the carrying out of execution). Most scholars look to 
the Rex case for establishing the wild beast test. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764-65 (1724) 
(“If a man be deprived of his reason, and consequently, his intention, he cannot be guilty . . . [he] 
does not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast.”). Yet some 
have argued that the wild beast test was never validly articulated. See Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant 
Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully 
Preserved the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 996 n.3 (1987) (“It 
has been persuasively argued, however, that the phrase ‘wild beast,’ as employed in Arnold and 
other eighteenth century British cases is merely illustrative, and was never meant to establish a 
specific test for the determination of legal insanity.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently affirmed 
this position in Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006), by upholding Arizona’s insanity statute 
which jettisoned the cognition prong in favor of a sole moral prong. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The 
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780 (2006) (noting that within the 
past thirty years the courts have mostly ruled in criminal constitutional matters relating to 
procedural and not substantive issues).  Notwithstanding, mental sanity has been an enduring feature 
of American criminal law. See People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 773-74 (N.Y. 1999) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 834 (1999) (discussing the sua sponte responsibility of the courts 
in mental competency matters as a fundamental component of American criminal law: “[a]kin to 
every criminal defendant's unilateral rights to decide whether to proceed without the benefit of 
counsel, whether to enter a plea of guilty to the charge(s) or whether to offer his or her testimony at 
trial, the fundamental right of the accused to be mentally competent at trial is a right which is 
individually owned and unilaterally exercised by every criminal defendant, independent of any 
action by trial counsel.”);  Thus, mental sanity can be seen as important in a procedural sense as in 
the competency issues and substantive as seen in the various mens rea components and the insanity 
defense. 
 23. See Lee S. Weinberg & Richard E. Vatz, The Insanity Plea: Szaszian Ethics and 
Epistemology, 3 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 1573, 424-30 (1982) (discussing the history of 
the insanity defense); Bolton, supra note 21; Walker, supra note 21. 
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marked an impressive expansion of its influence in popular culture, law, 
and morality.  Whereas in its early years, psychiatry was rooted in a 
simplistic biological model of mental disease, Sigmund Freud brought 
modern psychiatry out to the masses.  Neuroses, ego, unconscious 
motivations – these ideas of Freudian psychoanalytical drives were not 
merely a new model of behavior.  Rather, these revolutionary concepts 
provided psychiatry the power to opine with ostensible scientific 
authority about all behaviors. The origins, motivations, implications of 
any behavior were now within the purview of psychiatric expertise and 
judgment.  This led to an exponential growth in the number and type of 
behaviors that were declared by the profession as indicative of mental 
pathology, and hence, open to psychiatric interpretation. 
The consequence of this effect is that our current popular and 
scholarly thinking is replete with notions that all behaviors can be 
explained through science.  Discussions about behavior and science 
inevitably lead to claims that behavior is caused by something other than 
free will and choice.24  Since modern psychiatry has become the 
authority on all behaviors – even those beyond the manifestation of 
disease – the pull is to classify all illegal or antisocial behavior as 
indicative of some type of biological abnormality irrespective of the 
scientific weight supporting such claims.  Thus, an insidious mindset has 
taken hold in our academic and popular thinking whereby all undesirable 
conduct is deemed caused by a sick mind somehow.  Scholars eagerly 
point to studies suggesting associations between some biological 
abnormality and undesirable behavior as proof of an underlying, albeit 
mysterious, biological agent that is implicitly responsible for the 
behavior.25 
While the last twenty-five years have witnessed a vast deflation of 
Freud’s theory among practicing psychiatrists, those influential years 
remain ingrained within the profession and popular culture.  The 
principle among these is the idea that psychiatry can and should have 
something to say about all behavior and its explanations are superior to 
others.  In the United States and elsewhere, these explanations have 
provided comfort to those who view the notion of free will too close to 
the idea of morality since mens rea evolved from ecclesiastic law, and 
hence, under the influence of organized religion.  Appearing 
scientifically objective, modern law has increasingly adopted concepts 
eagerly provided by the field of psychiatry, including the numerous 
 
 24. See DEREK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). 
 25. See Alison Abbott, Into the Mind of a Killer, 410 NATURE 296, 298 (2001). 
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sexual paraphilias and the antisocial personality to help achieve 
politically desirable ends.  As law has incorporated these psychiatric 
concepts into its jurisprudence, the creditability of both law and 
psychiatry has faltered.  One example is the pedophile, a diagnosable 
mental illness under current psychiatric taximetrics despite little 
evidence of a biological origin or effective treatment.26  Under the 
numerous sexually violent predator (SVP) laws, pedophiles are civilly 
committed for psychiatric treatment after serving their criminal 
sentences since it is presumed, with the aid of its validation as a 
psychiatric illness, that adult sexual preference for children is a mental 
illness.27  On the opposite extreme is the unquestionably psychotic 
Andrea Yates who was convicted of murder and faced a possible death 
sentence until public outrage and a convenient, albeit serious error, 
forced a second trial that ended in her acquittal by reason of insanity.28  
These occurrences inevitably lead to popular and scholarly skepticism of 
both disciplines – law and psychiatry – that hint that something is askew 
and lead many to a nihilistic realism about both. 
This article argues that three factors are primarily responsible for 
this current state of affairs: (1) the proliferation of mental disorders in 
the nosology29 of psychiatry; (2) the departure from traditional notions 
of illness in psychiatry towards a vague definition of “mental disorders”; 
(3) the inclusion of “personality disorders” and other phenomenon as 
diagnosable mental disorders that, at first blush, appear arbitrarily 
construed and sit in place of what is (or once was) considered poor 
moral character. When psychiatry turned away from the term “mental 
illness” to the expansive “mental disorder,” it opened a Pandora’s Box 
whereby almost any behavior can be deemed an affliction of the mind – 
and used by law to meet its own political ends.  If law is a vehicle in 
which political ideas are executed (and I think it is), psychiatry has 
unwittingly given law the means to achieve politically efficient ends for 
dealing with many socially and politically difficult problems.  Whether 
 
 26. Interestingly, what science mostly knows about pedophilia and the sexual disorders has 
nothing to do with etiology (i.e., cause) but mostly with assessing the risk that a person will commit 
the aberrant sexual behavior again.  Thus, psychiatric research in this area has mostly focused on 
what the law considers important instead of what medical science presumably does. See AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK REPORT OF THE AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (1999). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Yates v. Texas, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a new trial was 
required due to the prosecution’s psychiatric expert’s perjury); Woman Not Guilty in Retrial in the 
Deaths of Her 5 Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A20. 
 29. Nosology is the branch of medicine that deals with classification of disease. 
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through the de facto indefinite incapacitation of pedophiles30 or as an 
aggravating factor in criminal sentencing of “antisocial” people,31 the 
law openly rebukes the shortcomings of psychiatric diagnoses while 
readily utilizing its dubious classification schemes to achieve its own 
ends.32 
Part I discuses the theoretical frameworks of law and science.  I 
discuss how law is a discipline of the humanities, and thus builds upon a 
framework of logic, deduction, and belief.  Free will, a fundamental 
component of American criminal law, endures not due to some empirical 
finding, but out of belief, historical influence of ecclesiastic law,33 and 
its necessity in forming culpability, which lies at the heart of criminal 
liability.34  Or to put it differently, the legal system requires a belief in 
free will because public opinion demands it.35  Such demands are 
 
 30. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing 
the constitutionality of sexual predator civil commitment laws: “[n]otwithstanding its civil 
attributes, the practical effect of the Kansas law may be to impose confinement for life.”). 
 31. Antisocial and psychopathic behavior has been held relevant in criminal trials and 
sentencing phases despite its propensity as character evidence.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 
803 (4th Cir. 2003).  The erosion on the prohibition of character evidence is ongoing, see, Judson F. 
Falknor & David T. Steffen, Evidence of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the 
"Couch of the Psychiatrist", 102 U. PA. L. REV. 980 (1954); cf. Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due 
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005). 
 32. Compare Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997) ("The mental health 
professionals who evaluated Hendricks diagnosed him as suffering from pedophilia, a condition the 
psychiatric profession itself classifies as a serious mental disorder.”), with Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there 
is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.").  More to the point, perhaps, is that the 
deep skepticism the courts eschew towards psychiatry evaporates nearly instantly when psychiatric 
ideas serve a desirable end.  But see Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2734 (2006) (quoting Powell 
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968) (“It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution 
formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear . . . to doctors.”)); 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 (“[T]he term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any talismanic significance . . . 
. [T]he Court itself has used a variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those 
properly subject to civil confinement.”).  Although the court in Hendricks held that it was not bound 
by psychiatric classifications in upholding the Kansas statute and its mental abnormality provision, 
the very idea that pedophilia is a mental abnormality and not merely a moral failing is borne by 
psychiatry and its long preoccupation with sexual behavior.  One wonders whether the court would 
have easily came to the same holding had the psychiatric nosology foregone classifying any sexual 
behavior as a mental disorder –or even expressly forbade it. 
 33. In terms of criminal law, the greatest effect of ecclesiastic law was its concern for 
culpability and intent over strict liability.  See NORMAN J. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL 5-7 (1988). 
 34. Culpability seems to most contemporary scholars and the lay public as an absolute 
necessity in criminal law for the most serious crimes; yet, it is arguably the most difficult element of 
a crime to discern in terms of guilt or innocence.  From sex offenders to diminished capacity, the 
strongest opinions among the lay and learned are often associated with areas that have the least 
scientific weight to support them. 
 35. One way to empirically examine the free will paradigm is by looking at deterrence.  
8
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political and not purely deduced from observation and represent cultural 
and historical influences.  While free will is not solely a social 
construction as it can be inferred from observation of behavior across 
cultures, it cannot be proven in a pure scientific sense.  Modern 
psychiatry, on the other hand, posits itself as a natural science which 
draws upon empiricism, observation, and experimentation.  Indeed, the 
exponential growth in understanding mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression have occurred 
primarily through biological psychiatry which is most faithful to the 
tenets of the scientific method. In these major mental disorders, 
biological psychiatry has demonstrated that a disease process has eroded 
the normal operations of the brain.  In other areas that psychiatry claims 
as mental disorder, such as antisocial personalities, what biological 
evidence exists is weak and scientists are hard-pressed to show how 
these deficits are indicative of a disease process. 
These differing approaches between law and psychiatry lie in 
tension, as can be most clearly seen in examining the insanity defense. 
The law is interested in whether the defendant knew right from wrong at 
the moment of the alleged wrongdoing.36  Modern psychiatry views 
psychotic behaviors as outward manifestations of a disease process that 
impairs rational thinking.  The law is concerned with individual choice 
and free will, a concept that rests mostly upon belief in its existence. 
Psychiatry is concerned with rationality via the processing of sensory 
data within the brain to achieve an accurate representation of the 
 
Presumably, if deterrence works then free will among rational agents can be assumed.  The success 
of anti-drunk driving campaigns suggests deterrence works.  See Jonathan P. Shepherd, Criminal 
Deterrence as a Public Health Strategy, 358 THE LANCET 1717 (2001).  Likewise some argue that 
there is a negative relationship between crime rates and incarceration rates.  See Steven D. Levitt, 
The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding 
Litigation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 319 (1996). There is also evidence that perceived deterrence in drug 
courts is associated with better outcomes.  See Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Perceived Deterrence 
and Outcomes in Drug Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 183 (2005).  However, others have maintained 
that evidence for deterrent effects is weak.  Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Dealing with the Guilty 
Offender, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 445, 450-53 (Neil Brewer & 
Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005). 
 36. Indeed, knowing right from wrong appears to be the foremost question in the insanity test 
and other questions, including questions of cognitive ability to understand and appreciate one’s own 
actions and behaviors, have been held as superfluous. See, Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2722-
23 (2006) (“Though Clark is correct that the application of the moral incapacity test (telling right 
from wrong) does not necessarily require evaluation of a defendant's cognitive capacity to 
appreciate the nature and quality of the acts charged against him, his argument fails to recognize 
that cognitive incapacity is itself enough to demonstrate moral incapacity. Cognitive incapacity, in 
other words, is a sufficient condition for establishing a defense of insanity, albeit not a necessary 
one.”). 
9
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external world.  By examining the normal and mentally disordered brain, 
psychiatry claims it can identify the locations and processes whereby the 
brain goes awry.  But these claims are made entirely through 
comparisons of people considered normal to those who are determined 
disordered under the guise that normality is a verifiable fact.  Again, in 
the presence of signs of disease this claim is not that farfetched; but in its 
absence, the claim is troublesome.  Law can claim things because it does 
not posit itself as a science; when psychiatry does so, it is a different 
affair altogether.  It is not that the two disciplines speak the same truth 
but in different languages – they speak entirely different truths that 
underscore their epistemological differences. 
Part II discusses the evolution of psychiatry using the evolution of 
psychiatric diagnoses as a backdrop.  Essential to this understanding is 
the fact that psychiatry as a formal discipline is a fairly new 
phenomenon. Within about 200 years, psychiatry has grown from a 
cadre of physicians caring for institutionalized persons, to one of the 
leading authorities on behavior, motivations, and how the brain 
interfaces with the metaphysical mind.  Much of this growth occurred 
during the Freudian school’s zenith during the 1940s and 1950s.  During 
this period two critical events happened that forever changed mental 
health in the United States.  First and foremost, Freudian psychoanalysis 
brought professional psychiatry out of the institutions and into the 
communities.  Professional mental health was no longer reserved for 
those afflicted by serious mental illnesses; rather, it was culturally 
permissive for anyone to seek out the wisdom of the profession.  This 
simple but sudden transition made psychiatry a private and profitable 
industry with the lure set for mental health to become part and parcel of 
everyday living.  Problems that occurred as a matter of routine living – 
disputes between spouses, questions about child-rearing, sexual drives – 
were now psychiatric matters.  The other critical event was the discovery 
of effective drugs in treating many mental illnesses.  This had the effect 
of lending psychiatry the credibility that it could successfully treat what 
it designated as mental illnesses and began the era of biological 
psychiatry. 
Central to understanding psychiatry’s growth and influence in 
modern culture is an appreciation regarding the evolution of the 
diagnostic manuals the professional has used in deciding what qualifies 
as a mental illness.  The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
10
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and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)37 is the cornerstone 
of psychiatric taxonomy.  This psychiatric “bible” determines what 
behaviors will receive precious funding from federal agencies such as 
the National Institute of Mental Health as well as who can be committed 
against their will.  The current Fourth Edition relies heavily upon the 
biopsychosocial model of mental illness that emphasizes that mental 
illnesses have biological, psychological, and social aspects.38  This, 
however, is a departure from the 1952 first edition which was heavily 
laden with Freudian notions of mental illness.  I will examine the 
development of the DSM, most notably, the explosion of diagnosable 
mental disorders from about 100 in the First Edition to almost 300 in the 
current version.39  I will argue that while the present edition is more 
biologically focused than its processors, it has lost sight of mental 
illnesses as diseases – and as such the classification scheme itself is in 
question.  Thus, the present edition includes diagnoses such as “caffeine 
intoxication”40 and “substance induced anxiety disorder”41 – behaviors 
reminiscent of what Szasz said were the “tragedies of life”42 but hardly 
illnesses as commonly understood. 
Part III discusses why the term “mental disorder” is a myth: it 
incorporates behaviors that are not illnesses as traditionally construed 
and lack substantive biological manifestations of a disease process.  
Under the present classification scheme, pedophilia is a mental illness 
alongside with schizophrenia and manic-depression.  In looking at law 
and psychiatry, mental disorders as currently construed hardly seem 
faithful to Blackstone’s conception of the “wild beast”43 that clearly 
pointed to a person so bereft of sanity that the law should take notice and 
treat differently.  The modern use of dubious notions of mental disorders 
 
 37. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS – TEXT REVISION (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 38. See Engel, supra note 2. 
 39. See Rick Mayes & Allan V. Horwtiz, DSM-III and the Revolution in Classification of 
Mental Illness, 41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 249, 251 (2005) (reporting the First edition of the DSM with 
106 diagnoses at 130 pages in length with the Fourth Edition with 297 diagnoses at 886 pages); 
Lloyd H. Rogler, Making Sense of the Historical Changes in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders: Five Propositions, 38 J.HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 9, 13-16 (1997) (stating that 
the growth of the DSM is partially due to the inclusion of more disorders and the splitting into 
subcategories of previously unitary disorders). 
 40. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 232-34.  The DSM-IV states the obvious: Ingestion of 
caffeine can lead to, inter alia, restlessness, nervousness, excitement, insomnia, flushed face, 
muscle twitching, and increased heart rate. 
 41. Id. at 483. 
 42. SZASZ, supra note 1, at 1574. 
 43. See Blackstone, supra 22 and accompanying text. 
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encourages psychiatric defenses in criminal law such as the various 
“syndrome” defenses44 that push the envelope of creditability and 
engender abuse by political forces seeking their own objectives.  I will 
present several examples of how vague “mental disorders” have been 
used by law to pursue apparent political ends.  My thesis is that modern 
psychiatry has transformed many forms of amoral character into 
classified mental disorders; from actions of the imperfect, free agent into 
behaviors of the afflicted.  This effect is far more insidious than most 
people realize.  It is not just what the official psychiatric manual 
classifies as a mental disorder that matters.  Rather, it is the underlying 
belief that all behavior can be explained under a psychiatric lens and that 
this explanation is superior to others.  This outlook has pervasive and 
perverse consequences about how individuals and institutions approach 
social problems, including illegal behavior.  As many decry how the law 
deals with mental illness, the law represents the most illustrative 
demonstration of how law and science operating in a political world 
differ in theoretical frameworks and how those approaches play out in 
our imperfect world. 
Part IV presents some ideas for reform and discusses why these 
reforms are unlikely to happen. 
I.  LAW, SCIENCE, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Conflict between law and science entails disagreements not just 
about conclusions of important questions such as whether people with 
severe mental illnesses may be incapable of appreciating right and 
wrong.  Rather, they are steeped in traditions and practices 
fundamentally at odds with one another.  Law frequently asks normative 
questions, science describes what is observed in nature.  The goals of 
law may include perfecting justice, for science it is perfecting our 
understanding of material phenomenon.  Law is not science, and science 
should not usurp law’s claim to normative questions.  The goals of each 
discipline are inconsistent even when they appear identical because of 
their different approaches to understanding the problem to begin with. 
Law, despite the various schools of thought that may argue 
otherwise, is inherently a humanity and not a science.45  As such, law’s 
 
 44. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to 
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19 
(1987). 
 45. See Gino C. Speranza, The Medico-Legal Conflict Over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN 
BAG 123, 125 (1901) (“Law is one of the humanities.”). 
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penchant lies with logic, deduction, persuasion, and belief.  Despite the 
sociological jurisprudence of Pound, law continues to operate upon a 
system of prior beliefs that holds certain things true.46  The free moral 
agent, who acts without duress and chooses action A over B is arguendo 
the cornerstone of law.  From contracts to criminal law, the free moral 
agent is necessary for law’s function and legitimacy.  In this sense, when 
a person commits a criminal act like homicide, substantive criminal law 
places considerable weight on the actor’s mens rea in affixing liability 
and punishment.  To put it differently, the fundamental question in law is 
not whether to treat the defendant differently because of a mental illness, 
but rather whether the individual had the requisite mens rea at a point in 
time (during the actus rea).47  For law, a guilty mind is necessary insofar 
as it provides legitimacy for differential punishment.48  In Western legal 
traditions, punishment requires that the agent possess free will.49  This is 
 
 46. See Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An 
Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995) (arguing that law never embraced the 
empiricism of the social sciences as argued for by Pound and subsequent Realists). 
 47. Notwithstanding strict liability, of course.  In terms of the insanity defense, while there 
have been a series of different “tests” the enduring one is the M'Naughten Case, R. v. McNaughten, 
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (Eng. Rep. 1843), which excuses criminal behavior if under a defect of reason or 
disease of the mind a person at the time of the offense did not know the nature or quality of the act 
or did not know that the act was wrong; cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (Consol. 2006) that sets forth 
New York’s insanity test as: At the time of such conduct, “he lacked criminal responsibility by 
reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of 
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or 
appreciate either: 1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or 2. That such conduct was 
wrong.” Note that both the M’Naughten and New York test construe mental illness as a disease. 
 48. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00-125.60 (2006) (designating the types and degrees of 
homicide in New York).  Notably, strict liability offenses rarely, if ever, are designated as high 
felony crimes. 
 49. See Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 62 (2003) 
(arguing that mens rea is required because only it can give meaning to purposeful movements).  But 
compare Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 269 (2002) (arguing that neuroscience findings question whether traditional notions of 
consciousness, and thus, agency are correct), and Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: 
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 
1611 (1992) ("The specter of determinism has had a tremendous impact on moral responsibility 
theorists who work within the liberal paradigm. Operating under determinism's constant threat to 
undermine liberal accounts of moral desert, these theorists have been obsessed with the problem of 
defining what type of control over action is morally significant."), with Peter Westen, Getting the 
Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem with Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
599, 652 (2005) (“The supposed problem of free will and determinism is as false as the question, 
‘What is the expanding universe expanding into?’ It is a problem that we have created for ourselves 
by posing questions in terms that are inconsistent with the presuppositions that we must necessarily 
invoke in addressing them.”), and Joseph S. Alper, Genes, Free Will, and Criminal Responsibility, 
46 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1599 (1998) (arguing that genetic explanations of behavior do not negate 
traditional views of free will due to the complexity of genetic/environmental interactions that 
produce behavior). 
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so, not based upon any observable or verifiable fact, but because of the 
belief that it is so. 
Contrast this with modern psychiatry,50 which most believe has 
departed from its cult of personality a la Freud.51  Modern psychiatry 
claims to be a natural science based upon empiricism, observation, and 
experimentation.  Thus, it is concerned with measurable events that 
occur in the world.  Given this premise, mental illnesses are understood 
as behaviors resulting from a disease process in the brain.52  
Schizophrenia, a mental illness defined by hallucinations, delusions, and 
impaired thinking is now considered by most behavioral scientists to be 
a product of structural and functional impairments of the brain.53  For 
modern psychiatry then, actions of a mentally ill person are 
manifestations of this disease process – and part of that process often 
involves impairment of cognition.54  What matters here is that cognition, 
 
 50. Modern psychiatry has become synonymous with biological psychiatry. See Deborah W. 
Denno, Criminal Acts in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 652 (2005) (“[T]he 
DSM-IV and leading psychiatric journals now predominantly stress the biological component of 
mental illness.”). 
 51. See Carl I. Cohen, The Biomedicalization of Psychiatry: A Critical Overview, 29 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 29, 29-30 (1993) (noting that biological psychiatry is now the 
dominant version of psychiatry); Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry: 
History and Prospects, 10 J.  NEUROSCIENCE 1707, 1707-08 (1990) (discussing the rise of 
biological psychiatry). Freudian psychiatry was not based on empiricism, rather it was entirely 
theoretical.  See E. FULLER TORREY, FREUDIAN FRAUD: THE MALIGNANT EFFECT OF FREUD'S 
THEORY ON AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE 240-54 (1992) (arguing that Freudian psychiatry 
was both illegitimate and harmful to patients); cf. Alan A. Baumeister & Mike F. Hawkins, 
Continuity and Discontinuity in the Historical Development of Modern Psychopharmacology, 14 J. 
HIST. NEUROSCIENCES 199 (2005) (arguing the Freudian psychiatry did not constitute a paradigm 
and that the rise of biological psychiatry was the culmination of a linear growth of knowledge, and 
hence, there has been no true paradigm “shift”). 
 52. Again, I presume that modern psychiatry is synonymous with biological psychiatry, a 
view that some may disagree with.  In terms of the full panoply of “mental disorders,” there are 
surely some diagnoses that are not products of diseases of the brain such as Adjustment Disorder or 
Bereavement, see DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 679-740, but may represent some transient 
biological change or process reflective of (usually) an event that a person observes and 
contemplates about.  As I will discuss in Section IV, however, I do not construe these as mental 
illnesses. 
 53. See Christos Pantelis et al., Structural Brain Imaging for Multiple Pathological Processes 
at Different Stages of Brain Development, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 672 (2005) (reviewing the 
wealth of studies reporting numerous and significant abnormalities in brains of those afflicted with 
schizophrenia including progressive changes that occur during the earliest stages of the disease, 
often before the initiation of pharmacotherapy). See also STEVEN R. HIRSCH & DANIEL 
WEINBERGER, SCHIZOPHRENIA (Blackwell Science Ltd. 2003) (1995) for a general discussion on 
the various brain abnormalities associated with schizophrenia. 
 54. See TONMOY SHARMA & PHILIP HARVEY, COGNITION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: IMPAIRMENTS, 
IMPORTANCE AND TREATMENT STRATEGIES (2000); MICHAEL F. GREEN, SCHIZOPHRENIA FROM A 
NEUROCOGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROBING THE IMPENETRABLE DARKNESS (1998); KEITH S. 
14
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from a psychiatric perspective, is not an idea but instead a measurable 
enterprise of the brain.  Generally speaking, impaired cognition in the 
brain of a person with schizophrenia or other severe mental illness 
equates with deficiencies in attention, information processing, memory, 
planning, and intelligence.55  These elements of cognition are 
measurable56 and have salience to legal questions insofar as they explain 
irrational behavior.  Moreover, from this perspective, the concern in 
terms of “mens rea” is not understood in terms of whether a defendant 
possessed knowledge of right or wrong at a specific time.  Instead, a 
brain injured by mental illness is damaged because of a progression of 
disease that results in impairment, and subsequent behavior is a visible 
product of the pathogenic process inside the brain.  This, of course, does 
not mean that all behavior from a person afflicted with a mental illness, 
such as schizophrenia, is excusable or deficient. What it does illustrate, 
however, is that psychiatry views the behavior in these individuals as 
heavily influenced by a disease that is often degenerative and lifelong.57  
As such, even during periods of lucidity, behaviors of a person afflicted 
with an illness such as schizophrenia are affected and bear the markings 
of the disease58 lending understanding to important social and legal 
questions.59  While law wants to know whether a person with a mental 
 
DOBSON & PHILIP C. KENDALL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND COGNITION (1993); HIRSCH & 
WEINBERGER, supra note 53. 
 55. See GREEN, supra note 54, at 41-57; SHARMA & HARVEY, supra note 54, at 3-126. 
 56. Green’s book provides an excellent explanation in non-technical language how cognition 
is measured. GREEN, supra note 54. 
 57. See James D. Hegarty et al., One Hundred Years of Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis of the 
Outcome Literature, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1409 (1994) (reporting less than half of those with 
schizophrenia have overall improvements in premorbid functioning); George Bartzokis, 
Schizophrenia: Breakdown in the Well-regulated Lifelong Process of Brain Development and 
Maturation, 27 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 672 (2002) (reporting on the life-long reduction of 
grey matter in the brains of schizophrenia patients); Robert K. McClure et al., Neurodevelopmental 
and Neurodegenerative Hypotheses of Schizophrenia, 16 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY S15 
(2003) (discussing the re-emergence of the neurodegenerative hypothesis of schizophrenia). 
 58. See Brian Kirkpatrick et al., The NIH-MATRICS Consensus Statement on Negative 
Symptoms, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 214 (2006) [hereinafter Consensus Statement]; Tonmoy 
Sharma & Lena Antonova, Cognitive Function in Schizophrenia, Deficits, Functional 
Consequences, and Future Treatment, 26 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 25 (2003) (reviewing 
studies that strongly suggest an enduring cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia and cognition as a 
strong predictor of functional, long-term outcome). 
 59. See generally Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
419 (U.S. 1994) (holding that it is constitutionally permissible to forcibly medicate a mentally ill 
convict to be competent for execution); but see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992) 
(holding that a mentally ill defendant should be allowed to forego forcible medication to allow the 
jury to “assess Riggins” demeanor fairly) and Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that the 
state may forcibly medicate mentally ill defendants only under certain limited circumstances).   The 
issue of cognition, mental illness and constitutionality has been, in my opinion, grossly 
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illness had moral capacity during a crime,60 science cannot answer that 
question in the purest sense since morality is not a scientific question. 
Nor does psychiatry conceive of behaviors occurring during a single 
point in time in isolation of other factors as particularly meaningful.  
Thus, whether a defendant like Andrea Yates had called the police after 
she killed her children and admitted that she had done something 
wrong61 matters a lot to legal conceptions of insanity, but little to 
science.  From a scientific perspective, Yates had a demonstrable history 
of psychosis, which is an illness that severely undermines perception and 
judgment that is best understood by examining behaviors in totem.  
From a legal perspective, one could argue that Yates was indeed sane;62 
from a scientific one, she was clearly crazy. 
A. Competency as an Exemplar 
One way to understand the premise of mental disease as I have 
outlined is by examining competency.  The law holds that only 
competent persons may make contracts, make health care decisions, or 
stand trial in criminal proceedings.63  Psychiatric and psychological 
scholarship is replete with empirical studies, reviews, and commentaries 
on the issue of competency64 while the law, generally, makes short shrift 
of it.65  This can be explained partly because the law views agents in an 
 
misconstrued in a one sided, erroneous argument that antipsychotic medications are “mind altering 
drugs” when the overwhelming scientific evidence is to the contrary. Nonetheless, such arguments 
point to the importance of cognition and mental illness in the law.  See generally Thomas G. Gutheil 
& Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine 
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medications, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983) 
and Steven K. Erickson et al., Legal Fallacies of Antipsychotic Drugs (Dec. 5, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Yale Univ. Sch. Med. Psychiatry Working Paper Series), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=949229. 
 60. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2722-23 (2006) (discussing moral capacity in the 
insanity defense). 
 61. See Jim Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother Who Drowned Her Children, N. Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2002, at A7 (discussing the impact of Yates’ confession and 911 call). 
 62. See, e.g., Park Dietz Associates, Report of Dr. Dietz Regarding Andrea Yates, Feb. 25, 
2002, 
http://www.parkdietzassociates.com/files/Report_of_Dr._Park_Dietz_re._Andrea_Yates__2002.pdf 
(claiming that Yates was sane at the time of the murders). 
 63. See John Petrila, From Constitution to Contracts: Mental Disability Law at the Turn of 
the Century, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 75, 75-100 (2001). 
 64. A search of the psychology/psychiatry database PSYCHINFO under the heading 
“competency” indicated 5,632 hits. American Psychological Association, APA PsycNET, 
http://psycnet.apa.org/ (visited Apr. 1, 2006). 
 65. There are likely two indications of this: 1. The seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision on 
competency to stand trail, Dusky v. United States, was a half-page, per curium decision (see Dusky 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability 
16
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efficient dichotomy of either competent or incompetent and sets the bar 
fairly low.66  It is dichotomous and presumed rudimentary.  Psychiatry 
makes much ado about competency because it understands competency 
as entailing rationality, which can be profoundly affected by mental 
illnesses.67  But this profundity is not merely one of severity; it is the 
sensitive fluidity and fragility of the mental state enmeshed in muted 
symptoms that are directly pertinent to competency that also bears 
concern.68  That is to say, mental illnesses can (and often do) cause 
irrational behavior, but the impairments that lead to the behavior 
vacillate frequently and often without demonstrable outward 
manifestations.69  A person with schizophrenia who is lucid one day and 
over the next few days becomes convinced that the judge and lawyers 
are all involved in a communist plot to destroy him does so often in 
secret.  To reveal his knowledge of this plot against him would be ever 
foolish.  But it is not that one day all is fine and the next day is filled 
with Gulags, the K.G.B., and fear of assassinations.  The delusions 
overcome his sanity progressively as his brain slowly misappropriates 
events in the environment into defective, cognitive perceptions.  And 
that is the easy case.  Many mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, 
substantially degrade vital cognitive components such as information 
processing and abilities to engage in planned behavior.  This 
 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”); and 2. Despite some 
additional case law (notably, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), Medina v. California, 505 
U.S. 437 (1992), and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)), the trend has been decidedly 
against expansion of the original minimal criteria set forth in Dusky.  The unfortunate result is an 
erosion of the competency doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 773-74, 686 
N.Y.S.2d 246, 97 (N.Y. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 94 (1999) (cert. denied despite 
uncontroverted evidence that the prosecution’s psychiatric expert produced memoranda to trial 
judge during the trial in which he stated that the defendant was incompetent to stand trail.  The New 
York Court of Appeals held there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court); see also, A Crime of 
Insanity (PBS television broadcast Oct. 17, 2002 on Frontline) (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crime/etc/script.html) (providing an overview of 
People v. Tortorici). Compare with, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385; 86 S. Ct. 836, 842 (1966) 
(holding that a defendant's competency is so crucial to legitimate criminal adjudication that where 
there exists a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's competency, a hearing, even sua sponte by the 
court is required on Constitutional grounds); Drope, 420 U.S. 162 (determining that medical 
opinions are vital to determining a defendant's competency in a criminal matter). 
 66. Again, the Dusky decision, which established the substantive part of the competency to 
stand trail, suggests that while a “rational as well as factual understanding” is constitutionally 
required, a strong argument can be made that the test is neither complex nor demanding. Dusky, 362 
U.S. at 402. 
 67. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L REV 251 (2000) 
(discussing rationality in terms of mental capacity in the mentally ill). 
 68. See GREEN, supra note 54, at 25-26. 
 69. Id.; see also Consensus Statement, supra note 58. 
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pathological degradation occurs almost entirely sub silentio and has 
direct relevance to legal questions such as competency, but is often 
overlooked.70 
The importance of these differences between the law and psychiatry 
lies not with details, such as whether the law treats competency as overly 
simplistic71 or psychiatry misconstrues legal relevancy with clinical 
judgment.72  Instead, it is important to note the different approaches each 
discipline undertakes towards issues such as competency. Law seeks 
efficient rules founded upon persuasive doctrines because they 
encompass values, such as fairness and justice, that are rooted in larger 
rules (perhaps of recognition)73 adjudged as authoritative.  The goal is 
not aggregating data to reach a consensus.  As such, the findings of 
scientific research are only useful insofar as they clarify difficult 
questions of fact.  Alternatively, they are almost universally obstructive 
when they suggest permutations to legal doctrine.  Consequently, when 
science attempts to provide answers to legal questions, it often does so in 
an unaccommodating manner wholly inconsistent with law’s objectives.  
Is caffeine addictive? Science tells us that the answer is probably yes 
because mounting evidence suggests withdrawal from caffeine produces 
physiologic changes associated with addiction.74  What is the law to do 
with this empirical conclusion?75  Of equal importance, what does 
psychiatry do with it?  As will be discussed, infra, the trend is 
troublesome. 
 
 70. Surprisingly, there have been little neuropsychological or neuropsychiatric studies 
examining cognition and competency.  There has been one notable study, however.  See Paul G. 
Nestor et al., Competence to Stand Trial: A Neuropsychological Inquiry, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 397 
(1999). 
 71. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) ("And while the decision to plead guilty 
is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a 
defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial."). 
 72. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 152 (1997) ("[some] 
argue that minors are less capable of sound judgment, because of impulsiveness and a reduced 
capacity to appreciate the consequences of their acts, and thus are less culpable than adult 
offenders."). 
 73. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91 (1961). 
 74. Compare Aviel Goodman, Addiction: Definition and Implications, 85 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1403 (1403) with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37. 
 75. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 171 (2006) (“Criminal law’s concept of the person, including the addict, is 
the antithesis of the medical model’s mechanistic concept.”). 
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B. The Tribulation of Free Will and Tributary of Rationality 
The 1990s was dubbed by the scientific community as the “decade 
of the brain” given the tremendous advances in our understanding of 
how the brain works and influences universal experiences of perception, 
sensation, and judgment.76 These discoveries were indeed impressive, 
aided much by refined technologies that allowed researchers 
unprecedented access to the delicate chemical processes occurring on 
almost infinitely vast scales.77  Science has indeed learned much about 
the brain and many renowned scholars have imputed that these 
continued discoveries are the death nail for many ontological ideas 
important to law.78  But the rush to these imprudent conclusions is 
foolish and neglectful: foolish because the analytical reasoning from 
scientific results to erudition about the human condition is often fraught 
with mistake; neglectful because such conclusions ignore how science 
can provide new methods which validate entrenched social norms.79 
Volumes have been written by many wise scholars about the nature 
of free will and its vexing premise in an evolving scientific world.  
Briefly put, many have questioned whether free will exists and whether 
its inclusion as a precept in law can survive our growing understanding 
of the mind and human behavior.80  But as one wise scholar has insisted, 
these questions wholly misconstrue the relevancy of such empirical 
findings.81  Law holds that people act for reasons and presumes that such 
persons have the potential to be guided by beliefs, discernment, and 
logic.  While even a dog can learn to avoid food it desires because of 
past negative conditioning, only humans can provide reasons for their 
behavior.  This is true not because a laboratory experiment informs us 
so, but because our collective experiences as humans informs us so.   
Thus, culpability under the law is inherently a moral and political 
 
 76. See generally Edward G. Jones & Lorne M. Mendell, Assessing the Decade of the Brain, 
284 SCI. 739 (1999). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Matthew Jones, Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact 
of the Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031 (2003). 
 79. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004). 
 80. See Jones, supra note 78 (arguing that genetic influences on behavior make traditional 
notions of criminal liability outdated and suggesting that future punishment will solely be justified 
by utilitarian arguments); Arenella, supra note 49; RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NON-REALITY OF FREE 
WILL (1990). 
 81. See Morse, supra note 67, at 252-53 (“When we [speaking of law] want to know why an 
agent intentionally behaved as she did, we do not desire a biophysical explanation, as if the person 
were simply biophysical flotsam and jetsam. Instead, we seek the reason she acted, the desires and 
beliefs that formed the practical syllogism that produced intentional conduct.”). 
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question implemented under substantive criminal law.82  Law’s power 
lies in its assumption that people are rational creatures who understand 
rules and can conform their behavior accordingly.83  Mental capacity to 
accomplish this requirement is presumed because a coherent regimen of 
law is only possible under such an assumption.  Free will is manifest 
through rational behavior and irrational behavior indicates the possibility 
of a fundamental disturbance of the mind which renders free will 
powerless or destroys it entirely. 
Thus, the important contribution of science and psychiatry to legal 
questions lies in its adduction of empirical findings to legal principles.  
Science is helpful when it can coalesce salient observations that help law 
achieve its goals of determinacy, efficiency, and moral legitimacy.84  
During the past twenty-five years there has been a veritable flood of 
empirical findings in the discipline of psychiatry.  As a consequence, 
psychiatry was transformed from its Freudian past to its present state as 
a natural science.  The importance of this transformation cannot be 
overstated.  Often overlooked is the fact that Freud’s theories of 
behavior were not true because of any scientific finding, but because he 
and his followers envisioned all behaviors as congruent with their 
ontological vision of humanity.  In this sense, Freud’s theories share a 
similarity with law since both fundamentally rest upon normative 
dictum.85  Modern psychiatry, however, rests on scientific principles, 
namely, hypotheses that are testable, replicable, and falsifiable.86  Its 
modern contribution to law, then, lies in its promise to validate, clarify, 
and summarize clinical understandings of behavior within legal 
frameworks.  To put it a different way, modern psychiatry’s 
transformation to a natural science means that “proof” of its claims 
regarding illnesses of the mind must satisfy the trial of the scientific 
method; it must also apply its findings outside of the scientific paradigm 
to that of law to preserve its legitimacy in law. 
 
 82. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 959 (1992) (discussing culpability as it relates to responsibility, which itself exists in a 
political and social context). 
 83. See Morse, supra note 67, at 253.  
 84. The recent Supreme Court decision in Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2712 (2006), 
presents an interesting view of how the Court construes morality and insanity insofar as moral 
capacity is deemed synonymous with cognitive capacity. 
 85. Of course, the empirical legal studies movement and even natural law scholars would beg 
to differ.  Yet I believe that even if they are right, the propensity of law is one of a priori reasoning. 
See Green, supra note 46, at 2045-47 (“Wharton’s pact with the angels survives,” and “[W]e mainly 
indulge the presumption [of free will] that underpins the law.”). 
 86. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2005). 
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Such an undertaking is vexing if not impossible as the paradigms of 
science and law, as previously discussed, are inherently in tension.  Even 
the founder of sociological jurisprudence himself seemed to understand 
this as he posited, “there will be much experimenting, some fumbling 
and much dissatisfaction.”87  Despite the impression that science and law 
do speak different languages, I do not find them entirely incompatible, 
for law does exist in the empirical world and science is contemplated by 
people who reason and judge by their humanity.  What is necessary, 
therefore, is that contributions of one to the other remain faithful to their 
essential principles and modest in their demand that the one 
accommodate the other.  To clarify this position, I present the following 
example. 
As mentioned previously, the law can exist only if it presumes that 
people are rational beings – that their behavior is guided by justifiable 
beliefs executed by a mind that can perceive accurately the world in 
which it operates.88  There will likely be disagreements among scholars 
for generations or longer as to what constitutes rationality (surely history 
is a testament to this).  Nonetheless, it is my sense that when we speak of 
rationality we are talking about the ability of the mind to engage in goal 
directed behavior when it can accurately comprehend the world in which 
it exists.  This implies that cognition is vital to rationality insofar as the 
mind is not conceived as working divorced from its biological processes.  
Of course, this brings up the mind-brain dualism of Descartes which has 
perplexed scholars for centuries.  This quandary is, I think, beyond an 
answer with certitude and one of the mysteries that will likely intrigue 
perpetually.89  Rather than enter that everlasting contemplation, it is 
 
 87. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 559, 588 (Roscoe Pound 
& Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922). 
 88. See Morse, supra note 67, at 255; cf. Jose L. Bermudez, Normativity and Rationality in 
Delusional Disorder, 16 MIND & LANGUAGE 457, 462 (2001) (“Rational agents with determinate 
goals in mind and reasonably defined conceptions of how those goals can be achieved by behaving 
in the relevant ways.”); David Hodgson, Responsibility and Good Reasons, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
471, 474 (2005) (“While it is true that the commonsense notion of rationality does involve such 
things as the ability to perceive accurately and reason instrumentally, it also (and crucially) involves 
consciousness, and, in particular, the ability to make conscious decisions and exercise conscious 
control over one's actions.”).  There has been much discussion of late about intentionality and its 
relation to rationality and mental illness.  This seems correct to me, yet I remain skeptical that it is 
entirely normative.  See Bolton, supra note 21 for a general discussion. 
 89. But I think that Dr. Andreasen gets it right when she says: “One heuristic solution, 
therefore, is to adopt the position that the mind is the expression of the activity of the brain and that 
these two are separable for purposes of analysis and discussion but inseparable in actuality.” Nancy 
C. Andreasen, Linking Mind and Brain in the Study of Mental Illnesses: A Project for Scientific 
Psychopathology, 275 SCI. 1586, 1586 (1997). 
21
Erickson: Myth of Mental Disorder
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
ERICKSON_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:30:55 AM 
88 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:67 
more fruitful to discuss a more salient notion when examining law and 
mental illness. 
One way modern psychiatry provides relevant understanding to the 
law is by explaining how mental illnesses affect cognition, and hence, 
rationality.90  Many mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, have 
profound effects on cognitive processes.  What matters here is that these 
processes are measurable and discoverable in harmony with scientific 
principles.  This is in contrast to claims made by psychiatry in the past, 
such as concluding that seeing a reflection in an inkblot was tantamount 
to narcissistic personality.91  Moreover, these findings have direct 
relevancy to important legal questions, such as competency and insanity 
defenses.  Thus, in this example, psychiatry can prudently dispense its 
understandings of behavior to law’s domain.  This is so because 
psychiatry can be faithful to its scientific principles while also imparting 
its understandings of behavior in a manner that understands the 
importance of law’s presumption of rationality to its own enterprises.  
Law and science are different animals so to speak, but science can 
inform law about human behavior and law can (and should) learn these 
important lessons.  Yet, science must be science, and thus, only claims 
supported by the scientific method should be held out as scientific truths.  
Much of undesirable behaviors now classified by psychiatry as mental 
disorders fail this vital test.  Understanding how this happened begins 
with a brief history of the institution of psychiatry and its growth as a 
powerful political force in popular culture. 
II.  ILLNESS, DISORDER, AND INSTITUTIONS 
If we lived in a perfect world, science would remain faithful to its 
method and law perhaps would be synonymous with natural law.  Of 
course, we do not live in such a world.  Rather, the present state of 
psychiatry has as much to do with the political institution it created as 
with science.  Understanding the conflict between law and psychiatry 
requires an understanding of psychiatry’s tremendous growth during its 
relatively short history.  This history is a story of the rise of a noble 
profession, its fall from public favor, and resurrection through the power 
of biological sciences and drugs. It is also a story of how a medical 
 
 90. There are surely others.  As will be discussed, infra, the demarcation between what is 
relevant or not lies, I think, in psychiatry’s faithfulness to the idea of disease. 
 91. See Steven K. Erickson, Psychological Testimony on Trial: Questions Arise About the 
Validity of Popular Testing Methods, 75(6) N.Y. ST. B. J. 19, 22 (2003). James M. Wood et al., The 
Misperception of Psychopathology: Problems With the Norms of the Comprehensive System for the 
Rorschach, 8 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCI. & PRAC. 350, 362 (2001). 
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profession became the leading authority on behavior by its timely 
assumption as the expert. 
Psychiatry has long struggled with defining mental illnesses.  The 
father of American psychiatry, Benjamin Rush, noted the hardship he 
would endure in formulating his understanding of mental illnesses at the 
outset of his famous treatise, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon 
the Disease of the Mind:92 
In entering upon the subject of the following Inquires and 
Observations, I feel as if I were about to tread upon consecrated 
ground.  I am aware of its difficulty and importance, and I thus humbly 
implore that BEING, whose government extends to the thoughts of all 
his creatures, so to direct mine, in this arduous undertaking, that 
nothing hurtful to my fellow citizens may fall from my pen, and this 
work may be the means of lessening a portion of some of the greatest 
evils of human life. 93 
Despite Rush’s incantation of the evils of mental disease, his pen 
would soon write what was a clear departure from centuries of ascribed 
dogma that mentally disordered behavior was the manifestations of 
moral failings.  For Rush lived in a time when there was growing interest 
in finding the physical cause that drove the behavior of madmen.  As 
Rush stated in the succeeding pages—and in the very title of his 
treatise—madmen were afflicted with a disease of the mind.  Moreover, 
the mind resided in the brain whose injury could destroy the mind.  
Sounding very similar to today’s scholars, Rush put forth that mental 
disease affected the “faculties and operations” of the mind including 
“understanding, memory, imagination, passions, the principle of faith, 
will, the moral faculty, conscience, and the sense of Deity.”94  Reflecting 
an almost pure reductionism for his day, Rush then held that these 
faculties operated through “sensation . . . perception, association, 
judgment, reasoning and volition.”95 Further, these operations relied 
upon “attention, reflection, contemplation, wit, consciousness.”96 
Rush’s quest to understand insanity among the putative madmen of 
his day was soon rivaled by other psychiatrists who wanted to expand 
the notions of insanity.  Rush’s formulations were concerned with 
 
 92. BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DISEASE OF THE 
MIND (1812). 
 93. Id. at 9. 
 94. Id. at 10. 
 95. Id.  For an interesting discussion on volition in psychiatric disorders, see also Scott 
Henderson, The Neglect of Volition, 186 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 273 (2005). 
 96. Rush, supra note 92, at 10. 
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psychosis, much of what would be considered today as schizophrenia 
and manic-depressive illness, while subsequent thinkers opened the 
possibility that criminal behavior was indicative of mental disease.  In 
writing his treatise on insanity, psychiatrist James Pritchard ushered in 
the idea of moral insanity.97  Pritchard was interested in why some 
people committed crimes despite heavy moral pressure of condemnation 
and likely severe punishment by society.  Displaying the ironic optimism 
that science would reveal a pathological basis for all abnormal behavior, 
while steadily trenched in the moral beliefs of his Quaker upbringing, 
Pritchard conceived of a mental illness that affected persons primarily 
through their feelings and judgments.  Pritchard wrote of people afflicted 
of this “moral insanity”: 
There are those affections of the understanding of rational powers, but 
there is likewise a form of mental derangement in which the 
intellectual faculties appear to have sustained little or no injury, while 
the disorder is manifested principally or alone, in the state of feelings, 
temper, or habits . . . [m]oral and active principles of the mind are 
strangely perverted or depraved; the power of self-government is lost 
or greatly impaired.98 
While Pritchard could hardly be blamed for his desire to understand 
the unrepentant criminal, his creation of moral insanity foreshadowed 
two movements that would later lay at the crux of controversy for 
psychiatry.  The first of these was his attempt to classify the mentally ill 
in divergent categories.  Pritchard saw mental illness as occurring once 
in the traditional sense of lunatics and once again in the morally 
depraved.99  These groups were similar only in that they both suffered 
from a perceived defect in essential reasoning that deserved medical and 
legal consideration.  From that point on, the “mad” and “bad” were very 
different; from their symptoms to prognosis they were worlds apart.  Yet 
Pritchard’s treatise also foretold psychiatry’s penchant to explain amoral 
behavior and transgressions by way of a sickness model.100  The obvious 
question to Pritchard and his contemporaries was why anyone would 
engage in amoral behavior – especially extreme cruelty such as sadistic 
 
 97. Interestingly, this concept of moral insanity sounds somewhat similar to the “moral 
capacity” enounced by the Supreme Court in Clark; yet few believe that the court was attempting to 
broaden the insanity defense to include the psychopathic criminal. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 
2709, 2722-23 (2006). 
 98. JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS AFFECTING 
THE MIND 11 (1837). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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rape – when it was presumed that healthy biology with plenty of social 
reinforcement strongly urged conforming to moral, orderly behavior.101  
Some contemporaries have argued that this behavior may have a quite 
rational, evolutionary basis.102  Moreover, Pritchard’s vision that certain 
people with a strong predilection towards antisocial behavior may be 
indicative of a categorical group with physiological anomalies was 
insightful for his time.103  Yet it also foreshadowed how psychiatry 
would “medicalize” behavior that it deemed abnormal despite little or no 
empirical findings to lend credence to its conclusions.  Psychiatry 
wanted to explain these behaviors through a quasi-medical lens because 
once it had transformed these behaviors into medical diagnoses; it could 
then seek to restore normality through psychiatric approaches.  Of 
course, it also could remove moral judgment in favor of medical 
judgment and give itself tremendous power in science, law, and society 
by being the arbiters of behavior. 
A. Building an Institution 
Power often comes to institutions when they have the ability to 
declare that certain things are so — a form of ipse dixit that comes with 
the complexity of a corpus of knowledge propagated by the very 
institution itself.  The law is like this.  It is not unfathomable that most 
people could probably navigate the original tax code whereas today it 
seems a labyrinth only chartable by the astute tax attorney.104  Thus, the 
 
 101. The moral insanity persona that Prichard posed was later explored in the legendary book 
by Hervey Cleckley and later by Robert Hare.  It has been transformed into the psychopathic 
personality that is ubiquitous in modern culture. See HERVEY M. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: 
AN ATTEMPT TO REINTERPRET THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1941); ROBERT D. 
HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 
(Guilford Press 1999) (1934). 
 102. See Stuart Kinner, Psychopathy as an Adaptation: Implications for Society and Social 
Psychology, in EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND VIOLENCE: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY ADVOCATES 288 (Richard W. Bloom & Nancy Dess eds., 2003). 
 103. Within the past fifteen years, a substantive body of research has demonstrated that some 
people with antisocial personalities with certain qualities are at a very high risk of recidivism.  This 
has led to the development of one of the best instruments – in terms of reliability and validity – that 
identifies such individuals, the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). ROBERT D. HARE, HARE PCL-R 
(2nd ed. 2003).   This is not mere intellectual amusement, as the PCL is used extensively in 
psychiatric assessments for the courts. See James F. Hemphill & Stephen D. Hart, Forensic and 
Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC 
PSYCHOLOGY 87, 606 (Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003).  Additionally, there is 
some indication of abnormal brain physiology among these “psychopaths.” See CHRISTOPHER J. 
PATRICK, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 251-334 (2005) for a great review of these findings. 
 104. See Theodore J. Forstmann & Stephen Moore, Abolish the Tax Code, Not the IRS, Cato 
Institute, available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/5-13-98.html (visited Apr. 7, 2006) (noting that 
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power of the bar.  For psychiatry, history shows that power lies in its 
classification of abnormal behavior followed by its guiding the rest of us 
through its nosology105 and offering treatment that is often lifelong. 
1.  Early Origins and Practices 
Perhaps the first instance of classification of mental illness in the 
United States can be traced to the census.  During the hygiene movement 
of the early 1800s, Congress became concerned with many social 
problems that were viewed as affecting the fabric of society.106  In 1840, 
the census created seven categories of official mental diseases: mania, 
melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and 
epilepsy.107  As the prevalence of schizophrenia and other severe mental 
illnesses continued to rise through the Nineteenth Century,108 the 
psychiatric professional felt the demands to better define mental illness 
and its origins.  Eminent psychiatrists such as Emil Kraepelin and Paul 
Eugen Bleuler, among others, responded by publishing textbooks with 
the aim of describing and classifying various mental illnesses.109  In 
addition, in 1913 the Committee on Statistics of the American Medical 
Publishers Association (AMPA) was formed under the Census Bureau 
and charged with the task of organizing the chaotic state of information 
on mental illnesses.110  Up to this time, there had been little coherent 
structure in how mental illnesses were described or categorized, with 
several competing schools of thought vying for recognition in how 
mental illnesses should be conceived overall.111 
 
the first version of the U.S. tax code was 1 page whereas the current version is lengthier than the 
entire Encyclopedia Britannica). 
 105. Nosology is the branch of medicine that classifies diseases. 
 106. See Gerald N. Grob, Origins of DSM-I: A Study in Appearance and Reality, 148 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 421 (1991). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See E. FULLER TORREY & JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT (Rutgers University Press 2001) (1937) (examining the 
precipitous rise of severe mental illnesses in the U.S. and U.K.). 
 109. See EMIL KRAEPELIN & ALAN R. DIEFENDORF, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY: A TEXTBOOK FOR 
STUDENTS AND PHYSICIANS (J.S. Cushing & Co. 1912) (1907); PAUL EUGEN BLEULER, TEXTBOOK 
ON PSYCHIATRY (1924). 
 110. See Grob, supra note 106. 
 111. See Ming T. Tsuang et al., Toward Reformulating the Diagnosis of Schizophrenia, 157 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041, 1042 (2000) (discussing the differences between Bleuler and Kraepelin’s 
conception of schizophrenia. “Bleuler’s emphasis on theory as a means for determining the 
diagnostic relevance of signs and symptoms contrasted sharply with Kraepelin’s reliance on 
empirical observations.”). 
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Shortly after the formation of the AMPA, along with the National 
Committee for Mental Hygiene, the first standardized psychiatric 
classification scheme was published in 1918.112  The Statistical Manual 
for the Use of Institutions for the Insane113 was a biologically-oriented, 
non-diagnostic manual that mainly served as a descriptive administrative 
document for the federal government.114  The manual contained twenty-
two categories of mental illnesses that were almost entirely related to 
severe mental illnesses, including thirteen various forms of psychosis.  
Despite its limitations for clinicians, the AMPA’s manual would endure 
for thirty-five years with periodic updates.115 
2.  World War II and the Ideological Shift 
World War II was a transformative period in the United States and 
for all nations.  In the United States, women went to work in the 
factories as most young and middle-aged men went to fight a worldwide 
enemy.  But it also was a time of industrial and cultural transformation. 
The nation was becoming urbanized as the industrial revolution became 
entrenched in the American fabric.  From 1880 to 1940 the number of 
people living in cities tripled while the size of urban communities rose 
by about sixty percent.116  Similarly, the population was becoming 
denser as more people migrated to cities to avail themselves of the 
economic benefits of industrial work.117  Psychiatry was changing as 
well.  As its infatuation with Freudian psychoanalysis became firmly 
rooted,118 psychiatrists began to focus on the problems of everyday 
life.119 More importantly, however, was the impact of mental health 
 
 112. See Grob, supra note 106. 
 113. COMMITTEE ON THE STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION AND BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HYGIENE, 
STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE INSANE  (1918) [hereinafter AMPA 
MANUAL]. 
 114. See HERB KUTCHINS & STUART KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY 426 (1997). 
 115. See Grob, supra note 106. 
 116. United States Department of Census, Population: 1790-1990, 
http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (reporting an increase of urban population 
from 22,106,265 persons in 1890 to 74,705,338 in 1940 and for rural areas from 36,059,474 in 1890 
to 57,459,231 in 1940). 
 117. United States Census, Population, Housing Units, Area Measurements, and Density: 
1790-1990, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf (reporting a population 
density of 17.8 persons per square mile in 1890 to 37.2 in 1940). 
 118. See TORREY, supra note 51, at 92-103. 
 119. See Arthur C. Houts, Fifty Years of Psychiatric Nomenclature: Reflections on the 1943 
War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical 203, 56 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 935, 940 (2000) 
(discussing the transformation of psychiatric practice in the 1940s, Houts states: “Rather than being 
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assignments in the armed forces.  In 1941 there were thirty-five 
neuropsychiatric assignments in combined forces of the army, navy, and 
marines; by 1945 that number had swelled to 2,400.120  Psychiatrists in 
the armed forces soon became disenchanted with the AMPA’s manual 
given that it was aimed at treating the severe mental illnesses of those 
confined in state institutions.  Soldiers were suffering from the stresses 
of war, not schizophrenia and it was not long before psychiatrists found 
the novel psychoanalysis as a better means of achieving relief for battle-
worn soldiers.121  When the war ended, this cadre of impromptu 
Freudian psychiatrists returned home and implemented their new passion 
with zeal in post-war America.122  Soon this powerful group began to 
flex its ideological muscle, and led by the psychiatrist William 
Menninger, in 1946 they established the Group for the Advancement of 
Psychiatry (GAP).123  Built on the presumption that “psychiatry should 
transcend institutional care and treatment of the mentally ill”124 
Menninger and his followers rallied for an overhaul of the profession.125  
Realizing the power of Freud’s ideas, the psychoanalysts moved 
psychiatric practice from the state hospital to the community,126 from the 
mentally ill to the worried-well,127 in order to help the average man and 
woman overcome the tribulations of psychosexual development.128 
This ideological shift, like many things in life, was fortuitous as it 
enjoyed popularity during the largest growth of psychiatry (and 
psychology)129 in American history. In 1949, the National Institute of 
 
confined to severe forms of mental illness, mental-disordered problems were viewed as arising from 
life’s circumstances.”). 
 120. See Grob, supra note 106, at 427. 
 121. Houts, supra note 119, at 940 (noting that of the 11,400,000 people serving in the armed 
forces in World War II, 1,000,000 were admitted to hospitals for psychiatric problems). 
 122. See Grob, supra note 106, at 427. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 428. 
 125. Menninger’s influence was powerful in both his political force and ideas.  Menninger 
bluntly held that psychiatry could and should help the “average” person deal with the problems of 
life – a dramatic departure from previous notions that reserved psychiatric help for those afflicted 
with mental disease.  See William C. Menninger, Psychiatric Experiences in the War, 1941-1946, 
103 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 577, 579 (1947). 
 126. See Grob, supra note 106, at 426-30 (noting that two thirds of the pre-World War II 
members of the American Psychiatric Association had been employed in state mental hospitals 
whereas by 1956, only 17% were so employed with the majority employed in outpatient settings). 
 127. See TORREY, supra note 10, at 8-11 (noting that the 19th century concept of mental illness 
as a brain disease was replaced early by a spectrum concept that subsumed mental illness under the 
broad heading of ‘mental health’). 
 128. See SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey 
trans., 1949). 
 129. An important footnote is the fact that clinical psychology was nearly absent prior to 
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Mental Health (NIMH) was established from legislation passed in 
1946.130  As an institute within the federal National Institute of Health, 
NIMH provides the central, fiscal mechanism for research and training 
of American psychiatrists mainly through institutional grants to 
academic medical centers.  As sociologist Paul Starr notes, NIMH grew 
faster than any of the other NIH Institutes in post-World War II 
America: 
Of the various divisions of NIH, none grew faster than the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), created in 1949 under legislation 
passed three years earlier. . . . Between 1948 and 1962, NIMH research 
grants rose from $374,000 to $42.6 million, training grants were up 
from $1.1 million to $38.6 million, but state grants rose only from $1.7 
million to $6.6 million.131 
NIMH was a force in psychiatry, not merely because of money, but 
because it drove research and training.  Thus, the ideology of America’s 
academic psychiatry department, housed in the numerous medical 
centers across the nation, would play a crucial role in defining mental 
illness in the subsequent years.  As historian Gerald Grob explained: 
That psychodynamic insights quickly dominated the teaching of 
psychiatry in medical schools was apparent from a GAP survey in 
1959–1960. Out of 93 U.S. and Canadian institutions, 88 taught 
psychodynamics, 87 taught personality growth and development, and 
77 taught psychotherapy and clinical syndromes. The number of hours 
in the curriculum devoted to psychiatry also quadrupled between 1940 
and 1969. Virtually every chairperson of a department of psychiatry 
stated unequivocally that the psychodynamic frame of reference (as 
contrasted with the descriptive or organic) was dominant.132 
More importantly, however, was influence that Freudian thought 
had on popular culture.  “Slip of the tongue,” the “unconscious,” and 
“ego” are just a few examples of how Freud’s ideas have permeated 
American culture.  Likewise, literature, movies, and many of the 
disciplines of the humanities have the indelible mark of Freud and his 
declaration of human agency.  And crucially, during this period, 
 
World War II, reserved mainly as an experimental social science.  However, propelled by Freudian 
conceptions of behavior, clinical psychology grew rapidly in the postwar years. See SEYMOUR B. 
SARASON, THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1988). 
 130. National Mental Health Act, 60 Stat. 421 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.), available at http://history.nih.gov/01Docs/historical/LegislativeChronologyLaws.htm. 
 131. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF MEDICINE 344-46 (1982). 
 132. Grob, supra note 106, at 429-30.  Note that “psychodynamic” is, generally speaking, 
synonymous with Freudian psychoanalysis. 
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psychiatry itself became a powerful force in medicine, science, law, and 
various other fields.  Once liberated from the care and treatment of the 
mentally ill in state institutions, psychiatry was free to comment about 
human sexuality, the power of institutions, religion, and almost anything 
of popular concern.  Psychiatry became the interpreter of human actions, 
normal or abnormal, and soon care of the mentally ill was left to the few 
physicians who remained in the burgeoning state hospitals. 
B. Every Institution Needs a Bible 
After World War II, Menninger and Group for the Advancement of 
Psychiatry (GAP) began to push for a new manual of classification for 
mental illnesses.  The community psychiatrists working outside of the 
state mental institutions were no longer treating the psychotic or 
profoundly retarded, instead they were treating the populace with 
psychoanalysis and its variants.  In 1950, the first draft of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was circulated and 
then published in 1952.133  Heavily influenced by the postwar 
publication of the Army’s Technical Manual, Medical 203134 in 1946, 
the DSM was very different than its predecessor, Statistical Manual for 
the Use of Institutions for the Insane.  Published under the auspices of 
the American Psychiatric Association instead of the quasi-governmental 
AMPA, the DSM took a radically different approach to psychiatric 
nosology.  Whereas the AMPA’s manual was mainly an outgrowth of 
the census form, the DSM-I was psychiatry’s first attempt to derive a 
diagnostic classification manual with the clinician as its intended user.135  
As a consequence, the twenty-two specific diagnoses in the AMPA 
manual were discarded in favor of three broad categories: organic brain 
syndromes, functional disorders, and mental deficiency.  Moreover, the 
DSM’s diagnoses were built upon the theoretical framework of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, which assimilated the newly popular idea of mental 
health within the bulwark of psychiatric expertise.136  Psychiatry had 
 
 133. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR 
MENTAL DISORDERS  (1st ed., 1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]. 
 134. Office of the Surgeon General, Army Service Forces, Psychiatric Disorders and 
Reactions, WAR DEPT. TECHNICAL BULLETIN, MEDICAL 203, reprinted in, 56 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 935, 935-67 (2000) [hereinafter Technical Manual, Medical 203].  Scholars have noted 
that the Technical Manual reflected a psychoanalytical bent and “was not influential because of its 
empirical merits.” Houts, supra note 119, at 944. See also WALTER E. BARTON, THE HISTORY AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 133-35 (1987). 
 135. See DSM-I, supra note 133. 
 136. Houts, supra note 119, at 943 (noting the transformation of psychiatry from biologically 
oriented pre-World War II to Freudian psychoanalysis postwar). 
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transformed itself from a discipline of scientists treating presumed 
biological diseases to one of experts discerning normative questions of 
psychological health among those with no apparent illness. 
Building upon the growing number of psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists working primarily in private offices137 and clinics along 
with the popularity of Freud, the DSM would become essential by 
legitimizing and perpetuating an expansive model of mental disorder.138 
By subsuming mental health under its authority, psychiatry entered the 
postwar era armed with a new optimism that social welfare could be 
improved by copious application of therapeutic “talk therapy.”  Under 
this novel view, individuals were not afflicted with a disease that robbed 
them of rationality by destroying the brain; rather individuals were 
aversely affected by relationships within systems that arrested their 
progressive development.139  If one was mentally ill, it was inherently 
due to environmental factors that could be explained outside of biology.  
Since god was dead140 in this modern world, a new institution had to fill 
the vacuum that explained why the interpersonal mattered.  If 
psychotherapy was concerned with the average citizen’s psyche – in 
some sense – all people were mentally sick141 and could benefit from 
psychiatric treatment.  Perhaps by happenstance, this new psychiatry 
required lengthy treatment, often years, which guaranteed a lucrative 
future for the generous number of psychiatrists leaving the armed forces.  
It surely was fortuitous that Freudian analysis lent itself to the worried 
well who could afford it as the number of people with severe mental 
illnesses filled the asylums, bereft of any meaningful treatment.142 
To understand this moment of psychiatric history entails 
underscoring the establishment of the DSM. The power of any 
 
 137. See Gronfein, supra note 12. 
 138. The DSM has been called by many “the bible” of psychiatry and arguably no other 
product of psychiatry has been more hotly debated. See generally HERB KUCHINS & STUART KIRK, 
THE SELLING OF DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN PSYCHIATRY 1-12 (1992). 
 139. Surely some would argue that this is a simplification, but I view it as quite accurate. 
While Freud argued that individual instinctively desired aggression, sex, and other primitive drives, 
it was society, represented by the superego, that kept these behaviors under control, but that also 
caused distress in the individual. See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (James 
Strachey Trans., 1962) (1961). 
 140. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCES (1882), reprinted in THE IDLER’S 
COMPANION: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LAZY LITERATURE 208-10 (Tom Hodgkinson & Matthew De 
Abaitua eds., 1997). 
 141. See FREUD, supra note 128 (describing “man” as the sick animal). 
 142. See Joseph P. Morrissey & Howard H. Goldman, Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill 
in the United States: Historical Developments and Reforms, 484 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 12, 19 (1986) (reporting that in 1950, 150,000 people were located in state psychiatric hospitals 
– a 240% increase since 1903). 
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influential book lies not just in its ideas but in its power to transform 
those who read it and are willing to be governed by its epistemology 
which invariably becomes institutionalized.  The birth of the DSM was a 
watershed for psychiatry because it solidified the prevailing psychiatric 
thought into an institution of enormous power.  Several factors of this 
moment are of particular note.  First, the importance of DSM’s creation 
in 1952 compared to the previous taxonomies of mental illnesses rested 
with its institutional authority and sovereignty.  The authority of the 
American Psychiatric Association – the author of the DSM – lies in its 
ability to declare certain behavior abnormal.  The first edition of the 
DSM was much like law in this way since the biological mechanisms of 
mental illnesses were poorly understood and mostly abandoned in the 
first edition.  Thus, it held certain behaviors abnormal either because 
historically they had been considered such or because they were part of a 
larger entity – a disorder perhaps – that fit a theoretical model.  Thus, a 
neurotic person could be pronounced so not just on the authority of 
psychiatry alone, but because the therapist, individually, and psychiatry 
as an institution, could assert expertise as to why and how a behavior 
existed.  This was done not because some discovery in a laboratory 
informed the psychiatric profession that it was true, but because the 
powers within the profession pronounced it so.  The sovereignty that the 
DSM enjoyed was due to the fact that it was authored solely by the 
psychiatric association itself.  Whereas previous classification manuals 
such as the AMPA’s manual143 were complied with direct governmental 
agency direction, the DSM was solely the product of the profession 
itself. 
More crucially however, is that with the invention of the taxon144 
“disorder,” psychiatry was now free to greatly expand behaviors that 
could be included in the DSM.145  Once the profession supplanted 
disease with the captious idiom disorder, all mental phenomena were 
open to the speculation that they were illnesses in need of psychiatric 
 
 143. AMPA MANUAL, supra note 113. 
 144. Taxon generally refers to the science of taxonomy, which is the scientific classification of 
groups into ordered categories. In a more specific sense, the field of taxometrics is an emergent 
subfield in science that utilizes statistical methods to arrive at certain categories.  This approach 
holds a dichotomous view in which diseases or mental disorders are either present or not.  In 
contrast, the DSM is generally viewed as a dimensional approach since each diagnosis requires 
several factors to be present before the diagnosis can be said to be present in a person. See NORMAN 
B. SCHMIDT, ROMAN KOTOV, & THOMAS E. JOINER, TAXOMETRICS: TOWARD A NEW DIAGNOSTIC 
SCHEME FOR PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (2004). 
 145. See William C. Follette & Arthur C. Houts, Models of Scientific Progress and the Role of 
Theory in Taxonomy Development: A Case Study of the DSM, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 1120, 1122 (1996) (discussing the taxon of mental disorder). 
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intervention.  So too, did this fuzzy idiom allow the line between mental 
and physical be transgressed without critical appraisal.  Thus, any 
behavior that produced discomfort or socially undesirable behavior 
could be asserted as representing a disordered psyche irrespective of 
biological evidence.  Whereas the old psychiatry of Pritchard and Rush 
presumed biological disease despite lacking actual evidence given the 
technology of their day, the psychiatry of early DSM actually disposed 
of this supposition.  This would be fertile ground for Szasz and others, 
who a mere decade later levied heavy accusations against the psychiatric 
institution by undermining its legitimacy through deconstructing the 
DSM. 
C. Drugs, Liberation, and Exodus 
While psychiatry surely benefited from the en masse infusion of 
practitioners and institutional funding it enjoyed from the federal 
government in the 1950s, it was the serendipitous discovery of 
psychiatric drugs that would lead to its greatest transformation.  As 
Freud’s ideas permeated popular culture, especially in America, the state 
psychiatric asylums were in disarray.  During the late 1940s and early 
1950s state psychiatric hospitals reached epic populations, with about 
560,000 Americans housed in long-term, state psychiatric institutions.146 
While psychotherapy was embraced by outpatient clinics primarily 
benefiting affluent clientele who mostly suffered from anxiety and 
moderate depression, state hospitals had become warehouses filled with 
patients with severe mental illnesses.147  What was so tragic about the 
state hospitals during this time was how far they had departed from their 
noble mission of providing humane care within an asylum.148  Current 
opinions of asylums are almost uniformly negative because of what state 
hospitals had become in the late 1940s and early 1950s – snake pits,149 
cuckoo’s nests,150 and the shame of the states.151  Yet, if there is one 
inevitable fault of human history, it is that so much of recent memory is 
 
 146. See Gronfein, supra note 12, at 437. 
 147. See TORREY, supra note 10, at 8-11; 91-140. 
 148. Perhaps one impetus to failure among institutions are mandates that result in a loss of 
control by the institutions themselves.  As one scholar has noted, involuntary commitments by the 
courts and a safety conscious society left state asylums unable to control inflow and outflow of 
patients, resulting in unmanageable growth. See Gronfein, supra note 12, at 442.  Analogous to this, 
one can imagine the present state of prisons in the United States and their inability to control inflow 
and outflow. 
 149. THE SNAKE PIT (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1948). 
 150. ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (Warner Bros. 1975). 
 151. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948). 
33
Erickson: Myth of Mental Disorder
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
ERICKSON_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:30:55 AM 
100 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:67 
biased towards the recent past.  The asylum was created at a time when 
many people with severe mental illnesses had few places to go and 
treatment of any sort was almost nil.152  The state hospital was an asylum 
in the true sense: a place of refuge for the chronically ill and unwanted 
who often could not care for themselves.153  What had happened to these 
once venerable institutions is what happens to so many institutions and 
noble ideas: time passes, demand outstrips supply, and new social 
problems supplant old ones.  So sadly, the state asylums had indeed 
become bedlam by the 1950s: overcrowded, under-funded, and bastions 
of neglect. 
But that was soon to change.  In the late Nineteenth Century 
through the 1930s, a number of French and German scientists were 
searching for new types of dyes to stain slides for microscopes. 154 These 
phenothiazine dyes were noted for their various medicinal properties, 
including the treatment of malaria during World War I, when the 
traditional quinine treatment became unavailable due to military 
embargos.155  In the 1930s, phenothiazines were explored for their 
possible antihistaminic properties in an effort to discover new treatments 
for surgical shock.156  After several formulations, chlorpromazine was 
discovered and used in surgery by a French army surgeon named Henri-
Marie Lamborit.157  Lamborit noted that chlorpromazine was a highly 
effective sedative and soon suggested to his psychiatric colleagues that it 
be tried on their psychiatric patients.  Its effect was monumental.  In the 
spring of 1952, a pair of French psychiatrists, Jean Delay and Pierre 
Deniker, presented and published their experiences with this new 
drug.158  One of their case reports was typical of how this new drug 
would transform psychiatry: 
Giovanni A., a 57-year-old manual worker with a long history of 
mental pathology, admitted for “giving improvised political speeches, 
getting into fights with strangers and walking along the street with a 
 
 152. See Aaron Rosenblatt, Concepts of the Asylum in the Care of the Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 244 (1984). 
 153. See William Vogel, A Personal Memoir of the State Hospitals of the 1950’s, 42 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 593 (1991) (claiming that the state hospitals served an important 
charitable function by providing palliative care for the disenfranchised). 
 154. See Francisco Lopez-Munoz et al., History of the Discovery and Clinical Introduction of 
Chlorpromazine, 17 ANNALS CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (2005) [hereinafter Clinical 
Introduction of Chlorpromazine]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 116-17. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 120; Jean Delay et al., Utilisation en Therapeutique d'une Phenothiazine d'Action 
Centrale Selective, 110 ANNALES MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGIQUES 112 (1952). 
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plant pot on his head proclaiming his love of liberty.” After a 9-day 
treatment with chlorpromazine, he was able to maintain a normal 
conversation, and within 3 weeks he was in such a calm state that he 
was able to be discharged.159 
What Lamborit and his colleagues had discovered would become 
the first successful treatment for many severe mental illnesses and would 
eventually usher in a new era of biological psychiatry.  That 
transformation, however, would have to overcome the stronghold of 
Freud, which by the 1950s had been firmly ensconced in the United 
States.  Chlorpromazine would come to the Americas via Canada where 
a series of studies by the psychiatrist Heinz Lehmann documented 
significant improvement in two-thirds of patients given the drug.160  The 
pharmaceutical giant, Smith Kline, introduced chlorpromazine in the 
U.S. in 1954 under the trade name Thorazine.  During that year, doctors 
from McLean Hospital in Boston and Sidney Hillman Medical Center in 
Philadelphia published favorable studies161 of the new drug. Soon 
Thorazine was widely used in state hospitals across the country, 
producing seventy-five million dollars of revenues for Smith Kline in 
1955.162 
The discovery and clinical application of psychotropic drugs 
completely transformed psychiatry and mental illness.  In 1956, a year 
after Thorazine was introduced in the United States, the number of 
patients at state hospitals fell for the first time since the early 1900s.163 
This was a rapid reversal given that since the birth of the new century, 
the census of America’s state hospitals had been massively increasing.164 
The introduction of Thorazine was so monumental to psychiatry that a 
prominent psychiatrist from Harvard medical school claimed one year 
after its introduction that Thorazine had “totally changed psychiatric 
practice.”165 Indeed, Thorazine brought science to psychiatry and 
directly challenged the authority of Freud’s ideas.  It did so because in 
one year, Thorazine managed to do what decades of Freudian ideology 
 
 159. Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, supra note 154, at 120. 
 160. Id. at 123-24. 
 161. Willis H. Bower, Chlorpromazine in Psychiatric Illness, 251 NEW ENG. J. MED. 689 
(1954); N. William Winkelman, Chlorpromazine in the Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Disorders, 
155 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 18 (1954). 
 162. Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, supra note 154, at 127. 
 163. Id. at 129. 
 164. Id. In 1900, there were about 150,000 people in state psychiatric hospitals, whereas in 
1955 there were about 500,000. 
 165. See Mark D. Altschule, Use of Chlorpromazine and Reserpine in Mental Disorders, 254 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 515 (1956). 
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and a century of psychiatric thought was unable to do: it brought hope to 
the severely mentally ill in a manner that was manifestly obvious.166  
Simultaneously, scientists also discovered and used the first 
antidepressant, ipronizid, and the utility of lithium salts for manic-
depression became readily apparent.167 While drug therapy was no 
panacea – it was neither a cure nor a complete treatment – it made such 
an appreciable impact on the symptoms of so many mental illnesses that 
its force would soon be felt throughout psychiatry and the country.168 
The force of drug therapy in psychiatry occurred during a time 
when society was changing forcefully too.  The 1960s was a period of 
tremendous change and it would affect the very nature of how mental 
disorders were construed, treated, and utilized by political powers.  The 
widespread clinical application of drug therapy was a monumental wave 
that forever changed the landscape of psychiatric practice. But as often is 
the case in society governed by the rule of law, the enactment of far-
reaching statutes had their own profound effects as well—perhaps more 
so.  In 1961, the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health 
formally adopted deinstitutionalization of state hospitals as federal 
policy.169  In 1963, Congress enacted the Community Mental Health 
Centers Act170 which along with the enactment of Medicaid in 1965171 
provided strong fiscal leverage to promote outpatient care for the 
mentally ill.  Medicaid provided matching fiscal dollars to the states for 
proving health care to the poor and expressly excluded most inpatient 
psychiatric treatment from reimbursement.172 Known as the “IMD 
 
 166. See, e.g., Gronfein, supra note 12, at 443-44 for several descriptions of utter amazement 
by hospitals workers in the 1950s at the beneficial effects of Thorazine. 
 167. See Erik Jacobsen, The Early History of Psychotherapeutic Drugs, 89 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 138, 141-42 (1986). 
 168. See generally Michael Rosenbloom, Chlorpromazine and the Psychopharmacologic 
Revolution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1860 (2002) (reporting that within eight months of Thorazine's 
introduction to the United States, eight million patients had received the drug and with an efficacy 
rate of seventy percent). 
 169. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
(1961).  See also, Rhoden, supra note 16, at 378 n.14 and accompanying text (discussing the 
commission’s findings and recommendations related to hospitalization). 
 170. Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282, 290-94 
(1963). 
 171. Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 121 et seq., 79 
Stat. 343, 343-53 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1369(d) (2000)). 
 172. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6403(d)(2), 103 Stat. 2258, 2264 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a)(16) & (h) (2000)). Medicaid funding for "inpatient psychiatric hospital services for 
individuals under age 21" is available only for: 
(A) inpatient services which are provided in an institution (or distinct part thereof) which 
is a psychiatric hospital as defined in . . . this title or in another inpatient setting that the 
Secretary has specified in regulations; 
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exclusion” (institutional medical disease), this policy reflected a 
historical distrust of federal support for state mental institutions and the 
belief that such institutions were the responsibility of the states through 
their parens patria powers.173 Thus, the stage had been set to provide 
strong fiscal incentives for states to provide outpatient care while 
providing little federal monies for continuing the inpatient asylums. The 
public shock and outrage over the decrepit asylums of the late 1940s 
along with the success of drugs like Thorazine served to justify these 
federal policies.174 
The overall effect of these forces was that the delivery of mental 
health care changed dramatically.  State mental hospitals opened their 
backdoors and closed the front ones.175  Care for the severely mentally ill 
moved from centralized state-run institutions to a hodgepodge of 
community care centers that relied almost entirely on federal funding.176  
Drugs such as Thorazine provided hope for those with the malignant 
forms of mental illness and signaled the beginning of the drug therapy 
approach for clinical treatment of mental illnesses.  What soon would 
become obvious to many, however, was that for the severely mentally 
 
(B) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual (i) involved active treatment 
which meets [certain specified] standards . . ., and (ii) a team, consisting of physicians 
and other personnel qualified to make determinations with respect to mental health 
conditions and the treatment thereof, has determined are necessary on an inpatient basis 
and can reasonably be expected to improve the condition, by reason of which such 
services are necessary, to the extent that eventually such services will no longer be 
necessary; and 
(C) inpatient services which, in the case of any individual, are provided prior to (i) the 
date such individual attains age 21, or (ii) in the case of an individual who was receiving 
such services in the period immediately preceding the date on which he attained age 21, 
(I) the date such individual no longer requires such services, or (II) if earlier, the date 
such individual attains age 22; 
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(h)(1). 
 173. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 242 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep. 
No. 404, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 20 (1965)); Joanmarie I. Davoli, No Room at the Inn: How 
the Federal Medicaid Program Created Inequities in Psychiatric Hospital Access for the Indigent 
Mentally Ill, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 159, 165 (2003). 
 174. See Rhoden, supra note 16, at 380-81 for a description of the deplorable conditions of 
state hospitals as a political factor fueling deinstitutionalization. 
 175. See William Gronfein, Incentives and Intentions in Mental Health Policy: A Comparison 
of the Medicaid and Community Mental Health Programs, 26 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 192 
(1985) (describing the influence of Medicaid on admission and discharge rates in state hospitals 
during the 1950s and 1960s). 
 176. See TORREY supra note 10, at 91-140 (describing the proliferation of CMHC and decline 
of state hospitals); Samuel Slipp, The Hospital Without Walls: An Aftercare Program for Chronic 
Schizophrenic Patients, 6 GROUPS: A J. GROUP DYNAMICS & PSYCHOTHERAPY 21 (1976) 
(describing the idea of a “hospital without walls” which would become a calling card for 
community treatment for the severely mentally ill). 
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ill, drugs alone were not curative.177  What the state hospitals had 
provided for good or naught was a restricted environment that precluded 
many from foregoing treatment or choosing illicit drugs instead to cope 
with their symptoms.178 
D. Psychiatry Under Fire 
Despite the remarkable progress that psychiatry made in treating 
mental illnesses in the 1950s and 1960s, it was under scrutiny by various 
factions which seriously questioned its legitimacy.179  To understand 
why, one must keep in mind other social conditions that occurred 
concurrently.  The 1960s was a time of social unrest during which 
authority was openly challenged.180  The civil rights movement sought to 
undermine and reorganize institutions that were perceived as 
perpetuating racism.181  The Vietnam War and student protests placed 
many young Americans in direct opposition to their government.182  In 
sum, it was a season of upheaval and unrest.  The horrors of the state 
asylums were well known to the public and many critics questioned 
whether psychiatry was merely a form of social control.183  Many 
psychiatrists themselves questioned the traditional wisdom of psychiatric 
causation and classification.184  Psychiatrists R.D. Laing185 and Theodore 
Lidz186 proposed that schizophrenia was not a brain disease but a 
psychological injury caused by improper parenting.  Szasz and his 
contemporaries would write scathing critiques of psychiatry at a time 
when new psychotherapies were in fashion.187  Many of these new 
therapies sought to go beyond the rigid models of Freud and 
 
 177. See, e.g., Gary R. Bond et al., Assertive Community Treatment for People with Severe 
Mental Illnesses: Critical Ingredients and Impact on Patients, 9 DISEASE MANAGEMENT & HEALTH 
OUTCOMES 141 (2001) (discussing the limits of psychiatric medicines and describing a 
comprehensive model for community treatment). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 252-54; see also Henry J. Steadman, The 
Psychiatrist as a Conservative Agent of Social Control, 20 SOC. PROBS. 263 (1972). 
 180. See MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE 
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960’S 64-66 (2005). 
 181. See Aldon D. Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and 
Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 517 (1999). 
 182. See FLAMM, supra note 180, at 112-13. 
 183. See SZASZ, supra note 1, at 12; Drammann, supra note 5, at 734-37. 
 184. See Szasz, supra note 20. 
 185. R. D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF: AN EXISTENTIAL STUDY IN SANITY AND MADNESS 
(1965). 
 186. THEODORE LIDZ, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY (1965). 
 187. See CARL ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961); B. F. SKINNER, ABOUT 
BEHAVIORISM  (1975). 
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biomedicine and explained behavior as an intensely personal matter 
wherein the patient was the expert of their own emotions and 
behavior.188  The enormously popular philosopher Michael Foucault 
proposed that mental illnesses were merely labels that allowed the 
powerful to stigmatize undesirable or asocial people.189 
The institution of psychiatry only further incriminated itself during 
these trying times.  In 1968, the American Psychiatric Association 
published the Second Edition of the DSM (DSM-II).190  Whereas the 
first edition had three broad categories of mental disorders, the new 
edition had ten, with a total of 162 diagnoses.191  What is remarkable 
about this growth was that the intervening years was not during a time 
when American psychiatry was engaged in scientific experimentation 
but under the influence of Freud.  Since Freudian theory was just that – 
theory – the proliferation of new disorders absent an empirical 
foundation was astonishing.  What had changed between the editions, 
however, was the adoption of the Freudian paradigm and its 
institutionalization into America’s social consciousness.192  So too, had it 
grown in influence and power as it left the small world of severe, mental 
illnesses of the state hospitals and became a ubiquitous part of American 
culture. 
Although psychiatry had evolved much since the 1940s, it could not 
keep pace against the backdrop of social change in the 1960s and 1970s.  
After several years of protest by gay activists at the American 
Psychiatric Association’s annual meetings, the association’s membership 
voted in 1973 to delete the contested diagnosis of homosexuality.193  
Instead, beginning with the seventh printing of the DSM-II, 
homosexuality would be referred to as a “sexual orientation disturbance” 
and formally disposed of as a mental disorder.194  Of course, it was never 
clear what separated a disturbance from a disorder, just as it was not 
entirely clear what differentiated a mental disorder from a mental illness 
or mental disease.  What is obvious in hindsight was that the DSM was 
 
 188. See Carl R. Rogers, The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person, 16 PASTORAL 
PSYCHOL. 21 (1965) (discussing his therapeutic vision of client-centered therapy). 
 189. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE 
OF REASON (1961). 
 190. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR 
MENTAL DISORDERS  (2nd ed., 1968) [hereinafter DSM –II]. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See TORREY, supra note 51. 
 193. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 258-59; see also George Mendelson, 
Homosexuality and Psychiatric Nosology, 37 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEAL & J. PSYCHIATRY 678 
(2003) (describing the historical background of homosexuality’s classification as a mental disorder). 
 194. Id. 
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on a progressive trajectory of broadening the rubric of its classification 
scheme to include behaviors that had little, if any, biological basis in a 
disease model of medicine.  Additionally, the deletion of homosexuality 
from the DSM indicated that psychiatry was susceptible to political 
forces which could successfully abolish a mental disorder that had 
existed for centuries.  Irrespective of the ethical implications of 
classifying homosexuality as a mental disorder, the psychiatric 
association had erased a supposedly scientific diagnosis by the stroke of 
a pen.195  In a Szaszian time, this action would haunt psychiatry for years 
and lend creditability to its mounting critics. 
The courts also played a role in psychiatry’s tribulation. During the 
1960s and 1970s a number of seminal court decisions radically changed 
the balance of power between professional psychiatric judgment and 
patient autonomy.  These decisions mirrored the shifting cultural and 
institutional views on behavior, morality, and authority.  In 1962, the 
Supreme Court decided Robinson v. California, holding unconstitutional 
a California statute criminalizing addiction.196 Soon there was much 
discussion about whether all conduct putatively derived from addiction – 
including possession and theft – should be held unconstitutional on 
Eighth Amendment grounds.197  In 1972, the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin decided Lessard v. Schmidt,198 a watershed case in psychiatric 
civil commitment.  In Lessard, the District Court held most of 
Wisconsin’s civil commitment statute unconstitutional.199  Wisconsin’s 
civil commitment statute was typical of the time with vague commitment 
criteria, few requirements for formal hearings, and generally few patient 
protections.200  The Lessard decision was considered a warning shot by 
most of the states and soon commitment statutes nationwide were 
substantively changed with the net effect that commitment became more 
difficult and inpatient stays much shorter.201  Following numerous other 
cases,202 it became clear by the late 1970s that psychiatry was in crisis.203 
 
 195. See EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO 
THE AGE OF PROZAC 313 (1998) (“[W]hat had been considered for a century or more a grave 
psychiatric disorder ceased to exist.”). 
 196. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 197. See Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L. J. 413, 414-15 
(1975) (discussing various court decisions and commentators proposing to extend Robinson). 
 198. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (1972). 
 199. Id. at 1103. 
 200. See Steven K. Erickson et al., Beyond Overt Violence: Wisconsin's Progressive Civil 
Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 362-
64 (2005) (discussing the statute, the Lessard decision, and the reformed statute post-Lessard). 
 201. Id. at 365-69. 
 202. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that insanity 
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E. Redemption Through Biology 
It is often the case that, through a confluence of factors, an 
institution can be fundamentally transformed.  Such was the case for 
psychiatry in the 1980s.  After two decades of ridicule, a new 
formulation of psychiatry was ready to sweep through the field that 
would eventually change every facet of its nature.  During the 1970s 
when psychiatry was in peril, a number of psychiatrists at Washington 
University in St. Louis and the New York State Psychiatric Institute in 
Syracuse began the clarion call for biological psychiatry.204  The 
biological psychiatrists started their mission by sweeping aside the 
discredited formulations of Freud, favoring instead a return to Emil 
Kraepelin, the early pioneer who sought to classify mental illnesses 
based on symptoms instead of a presumption of human nature.205  As 
drug therapies were refined and new technologies, such as brain 
imaging, introduced novel methods of examining the brains of the 
severely mentally ill, biological psychiatry offered the legitimacy of 
science to a battered profession.206  In 1980, the American Psychiatric 
Association published its Third Edition of the DSM (DSM-III).207  But 
this was no mere update of the venerable book. The DSM-III discarded 
its Freudian conceptions in favor of the Kraepelin model of symptom 
clustering.208  Whereas previous editions had included a “neurosis” 
category that originated from the precepts of Freud, the DSM-III favored 
 
acquittees have a constitutional right to treatment); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) 
(requiring the criteria of mental illness and dangerousness for involuntary commitments); 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (holding that clear and convincing must be the standard of 
proof for involuntary civil commitments). 
 203. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 252-54 (describing the “crisis of legitimacy in 
psychiatry circa 1970.”). 
 204. See ROGER K. BLASHFIELD, THE CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: NEO-
KRAEPELINIAN AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES (1994). 
 205. Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry: History and Prospects, 10 
J. NEUROSCIENCE 1707 (1990) (describing the flaws of Freud’s ideas and the rise of biological 
psychiatry); Wilson M. Compton & Samuel B. Guze, The Neo-Kraepelinian Revolution in 
Psychiatric Diagnosis, 245 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 196 (1995) 
(describing the ebb and flow of Kraeplin’s influence in psychiatry and his principles of diagnostic 
classification). 
 206. See Rogler, supra note 39, at 11 (discussing the problems of psychodynamic formulations 
that “represented the interposing of unverified assumptions of causality into the diagnostic function” 
and the “evocative” nature of DSM-I and DSM-II because the definitions contained therein were 
presented with the assumption of knowledge about them); Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 258-
66 (discussing how DSM-III and biological psychiatry was a response to the crisis of legitimacy in 
psychiatry). 
 207. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. 
 208. Id. 
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a multi-tiered “axis” that purportedly grouped various mental disorders 
according to common symptoms and possibly underlying pathology.209 
What did not change, however, was its appetite for growth.  The 
DSM-III was almost 500 pages in length with 265 diagnoses – a growth 
of over fifty percent from the DSM-II.210  Included in this panoply of 
disorders was an entire section of “personality disorders” that previously 
had not enjoyed categorical prominence.211  Under prior formulations of 
the DSM, personality was enmeshed within the theoretical framework of 
neurosis.  With the advent of the DSM-III, which claimed not to be 
associated with any particular theoretical lens,212 personality disorders 
were presented as a scientific reality.213  Moreover, the presence of such 
personality disorders, like all diagnoses in the DSM, was based upon a 
dichotomous categorization of present or absent.214  That is, a person 
was deemed disordered when they met a core number of symptoms – 
perhaps 3 out of 5, or 5 out of 7.  Thus, diagnosis was based entirely 
upon behavior – observed and reported – and not on laboratory tests.215  
While the absence of diagnostic tests was nothing new in psychiatry 
(there still exists no single laboratory test for any mental disorder),216 the 
absence of a theoretical underpinning for such disorders as “antisocial 
personality disorder” or “narcissistic personality disorder” begs the 
 
 209. See Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 261-63 (discussing the deletion of neurosis from 
the DSM). 
 210. Id. at 251. 
 211. See W. John Livesley et al., Categorical Distinctions in the Study of Personality 
Disorder: Implications for Classification, 103 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 6, 7; 12-14 (1994). 
 212. See Follette, supra note 145, at 1122-23 (discussing the “atheoretical” nature of DSM-III). 
 213. There has been much discussion regarding the charge that the DSM has “invented” mental 
disorders without empirical support. Compare Jerome C. Wakefield, The Myth of DSM's Invention 
of New Categories of Disorder: Houts Diagnostic Discontinuity Thesis Disconfirmed, 39 
BEHAVIOUR RES. & THERAPY 575 (2001) with Arthur C. Houts, The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual's New White Coat and Circularity of Plausible Dysfunctions: Response to Wakefield Part 1, 
39 BEHAVIOUR RES. & THERAPY 575 (2001) and Nick Manning, Psychiatric Diagnosis Under 
Conditions of Uncertainty: Personality Disorder, Science, and Professional Legitimacy, 22 SOC. 
HEALTH & ILLNESS 621 (2000). 
 214. See Thomas A. Widiger, The DSM-III-R Categorical Personality Disorder Diagnoses: A 
Critique and an Alternative, 4 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 75 (1993) (discussing the categorical nature of 
diagnosis in the DSM). 
 215. See Office of the Surgeon General, Mental Health: Report of the Surgeon General, United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, available at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (visited Apr. 10, 2006) 
("The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be more difficult than diagnosis of somatic, 
or general medical, disorders, since there is no definitive lesion, laboratory test, or abnormality in 
brain tissue that can identify the illness. The diagnosis of mental disorders must rest with the 
patients’ reports of the intensity and duration of symptoms, signs from their mental status 
examination, and clinician observation of their behavior including functional impairment.”). 
 216. Id. 
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question: how are these disorders of personality formulated and what 
makes them disorders?217 
Nonetheless, the DSM-III was congruent with biological 
psychiatry’s view of human behavior as a verifiable and empirical 
enterprise of the brain.218 It also returned psychiatry to the field of 
medicine by presupposing that mental disorders were discoverable by 
the scientific method.219  And biological psychiatry, aided by the 
emergence of molecular biology and genetics in the late 1980s and 
1990s, delivered results.220  Soon, scientific journals were inundated 
with studies reporting variations and abnormalities of various 
physiological processes in persons with DSM disorders.  A common 
presumption that became doctrine held that any physiological 
abnormality associated with a DSM diagnosis was evidence of the 
pathological process occurring in the brain.  The mantra in science that 
“correlation does not equate causation” was always proclaimed, but in a 
scientific world were everything is correlation and nothing entirely 
proven, this cautionary statement meant little.221 
III.  THE MYTH OF MENTAL DISORDER 
When Szasz wrote the Myth of Mental Illness in 1961 he directly 
challenged psychiatry’s legitimacy during a time when Freudian ideas 
dominated the understanding of human behavior and there were few 
biological explanations for abnormal conduct.222  Much has changed 
since then, yet Szasz remains steadfast.223  One striking criticism that 
 
 217. See Widiger, supra note 214, at 76 (“In fact, there was no empirical support for the 
threshold of 9 of the 11 personality disorders diagnoses.  They were based simply on the expert 
consensus.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Andreasen, supra note 89, and accompanying text. 
 219. For a general overview, see Eric R. Kandel, A New Intellectual Framework for 
Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 457 (1998). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Surely this premise is true in all of science insofar as scientific laws are never absolute in 
that causation is imputed when hypotheses are tested through experiments and reproducible 
observations are produced repeatedly over time.  Then theory becomes scientific law.  What is 
different in psychiatry is that science knows so little about the brain and even less about the mind. 
 222. See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket:" The Legal Significance 
of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 
1047-59 (2002) (reviewing the advances in the biological explanations of mental illnesses). 
 223. Compare Robert Michels, Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His 
Critics, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1273, 1273 (2005) (reviewing Szasz’s new book: “[t]his book, some 
60 years later, continues that attack [on psychiatry].”), and Thomas Szasz, Psychiatric Fraud and 
Force: A Critique of E. Fuller Torrey, 44 J. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 416 (2004) (disputing the 
biological psychiatry proponents), with E. Fuller Torrey, Psychiatric Fraud and Force: A Reply to 
Szasz, 45 J. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 397, 401 (2005) (“[i]n 2004, in light of current research, his 
43
Erickson: Myth of Mental Disorder
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
ERICKSON_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:30:55 AM 
110 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:67 
Szasz set forth was the failed attempts to discover physical markers of 
mental illnesses and what that meant for psychiatry’s legitimacy as a 
science.224  To Szasz, psychiatry’s talk about mental disorders made no 
sense because psychiatry held the supposition that behaviors were 
manifestations of the brain, hence, physical enterprises of the brain.225  If 
there was such a thing as mental illnesses under this view, then a 
biological aliment – an identifiable lesion located in the brain – was a 
necessary component.226  Yet, science had failed to discover such lesions 
for most mental illnesses.  Moreover, if such a lesion existed, then 
mental illnesses were in fact physical diseases of the brain, not mental 
disorders of the metaphysical mind.  Curiously, those illnesses with 
known physical lesions or abnormalities that cause psychiatric behavior 
are rarely treated by psychiatry.  Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s 
disease, porphyria, endocrine disorders – all are treated by other medical 
disciplines yet have key psychiatric components.  Psychiatry seems to 
flourish in the domain of presumed biological illnesses that are 
conceptually tied to behaviors.  This rather subjective proposition has 
lent critics, including Szasz, much fodder over the years, but are they 
right? 
An important question to pose relates to the definition of disease.  
A common view in science is that a disease relates to a pathological 
process that in some manner robs an organism of its normal 
functioning.227  Thus, one can deduce that the organism in question has 
the propensity for a healthy state and, if properly treated, will be restored 
to that normal state.  In looking at Blackstone’s “madmen”228 or the 
“wild beast,”229 what comes to mind are the psychotic disorders of DSM.  
That is, those people so afflicted with madness or insanity that their very 
 
unchanging views appear as an anachronism and allow critics to discard his entire corpus of work, 
much of which is still valuable. An inability to change one’s thinking when confronted with 
markedly changing data is not a virtue.”). 
 224. See Thomas Szasz, What Counts as Disease? The Gold Standard of Disease Versus the 
Fiat Standard of Diagnosis, 10 THE INDEP. REV. 325, 327 (2005). 
 225. See Drammann, supra note 5, at 736. 
 226. Szasz, supra note 224. 
 227. Granted, there are many definitions of disease and much controversy surrounding them. 
See Caroline Whitbeck, Causation in Medicine: The Disease Entity Model, 44 PHIL. SCI. 619, 622-
25 (1977) (reviewing entities [pathogens] as causation of disease). Nonetheless, the notion of 
pathogen and disease is strongly linked in medical history. See Robert Kock, Uber die Atiologie der 
Tuberkulose, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES KONGRESSES FUR INNERE MEDIZIN (1882) (describing his 
seminal Koch Postulates); cf. with STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 492 (26th ed. 1995) 
(“Disease: An interruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions, systems, or organs.”). 
 228. See Blackstone, supra note 22. 
 229. See Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764-65 (1724); supra note 22, and accompanying 
text. 
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personhood is degraded or destroyed.  There is no consideration that 
these people, in their ideal state, would in fact be insane.230  That is, if 
properly treated, they would resume their full identity which does not 
include the pathogenic process.  Consequently, their essence as a person 
exists beyond insanity.  Contrast this view with temperament or 
personality whereby any “illness” or “disorder” is typically viewed as 
intimately enmeshed with the personhood of the actor.231 Separating the 
supposed illness from the person seems difficult if not impossible; the 
illness is easily subsumed into the personal identity of the afflicted. It 
may be that such ill-tempered people deserve pity but it is hardly the 
case that they are viewed as affected by a pathogenic disease process.232  
Yet, in the current DSM, these two groups – the psychotic and the 
personality defective – are both under the rubric of mental disorder.233 
What this means of course is that psychiatry has silently enmeshed 
the two together and engages in a back and forth whereby the psychotic 
person is considered afflicted with psychosis that is pervasive in their 
personhood and the personality disordered person is imbued with disease 
of his temperament.  Yet neither is true.  Untreated psychosis can surely 
have enduring and broad effects on a person.234  Moreover, psychotic 
disorders like schizophrenia are indeed chronic, life altering illnesses.235  
But any reasonable clinician will tell you that psychosis neither 
intertwines with personality nor dominates it.  That is, a person with 
schizophrenia retains her personhood after the onset of the illness and 
between periods when she becomes psychotic.  A person who believes, 
despite compelling evidence to the contrary, that he is the President of 
the United States and Jesus Christ simultaneously for a few weeks and 
then rejects that belief after receiving a medicine that is known to affect 
 
 230. When I say ideal I mean if it were possible to “cure” or remove entirely the disease.  
Sadly though, treatment of psychotic illnesses rarely achieves full remission. See, Sharma & 
Antonova, supra note, 58. 
 231. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 685 (“A personality disorder is an enduring 
pattern of inner experience and behavior.”). 
 232. Not in any traditional sense of causation.  Personality and disease may be linked insofar as 
personality types may be associated with risk of certain diseases, but there is no creditable evidence 
that personality disorders themselves are caused by pathogens. See generally HOWARD S. 
FRIEDMAN, PERSONALITY AND DISEASE (1990). 
 233. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37. 
 234. See Srinivasan T. Tirupati et al., Psychopathology in Never-Treated Schizophrenia, 47 
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 1 (2006) (reporting widespread and disabling psychopathology in an 
untreated group of subjects with schizophrenia without any history of treatment). 
 235. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 309 (“Complete remission [of schizophrenia] is 
probably not common in this disorder.”); Kim T Mueser & Susan R. McGurk, Schizophrenia, 363 
THE LANCET 2063, 2063; 2066 (2004) (reporting lifelong impairment with schizophrenia as one of 
the world’s top ten causes of disability). 
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the brain, is evidently afflicted with a disease despite an absence of a 
lesion.  It is the profound distortion of reality and its direct response to 
medication that has a restorative propensity which suggests so.  This 
“obviously mentally ill”236 person is not engaged in an alternative 
speculation about the meaning of life when his behaviors fail the test of 
intentionality237 so clearly and to his detriment.238  Couple this with the 
compelling research that demonstrates multiple and substantial 
abnormalities in the brains of persons with these illnesses and it becomes 
apparent that psychoses are brain diseases.239  Now, returning to Szasz’s 
charge of the mental and physical duality – it seems that the term mental 
is useful only insofar as it relates to a disturbance of behavior.  As 
Nancy Andreasen points out, separating the mind and brain is only 
useful in abstract discussion since in reality they cannot be divorced 
from one another.240  Therefore, a physical disease can affect the mind, 
but there will never be any marker for mental phenomena because the 
markers we are interested in are physical ones.  That does not mean, 
however, that mental illnesses do not exist.  What it does mean is that 
evidence of a disease in the brain is necessary to give legitimacy to any 
claim of a mental impairment.  Moreover, merely finding some brain 
abnormalities in the brain of a group of subjects is not tantamount to a 
disease, as is the case in emerging research on psychopathic 
personality.241  Simply put, psychiatry needs to clearly state which 
mental illnesses are likely brain diseases and which are emotional 
difficulties and discard the disingenuous term of “disorder.”  It is not 
 
 236. See Treffert, supra note 17. 
 237. See Bolton, supra note 21, at 185-87 for a discussion of intentionality and mental illness. 
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 238. There is a wealth of research that suggests that schizophrenia is associated with an overall 
poor life course.  See, HIRSCH & WEINBERGER, supra note 53, at 101-41; Thomas H. Jobe & Martin 
Harrow, Long-Term Outcome of Patients with Schizophrenia, 50 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 892 
(2005) (reporting overall poor outcomes including increased risk of suicide and early death). 
 239. There have been numerous studies that have documented structural and functional brain 
abnormalities in schizophrenia and bipolar illness. See Pantelis, supra note 53; Stephen M. 
Strakowski, The Functional Neuroanatomy of Bipolar Disorder: A Review of Neuroimaging 
Findings, 10 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 105 (2005); Paul M. Thompson et al., Mapping Adolescent 
Brain Change Reveals Dynamic Wave of Accelerated Gray Matter Loss in Very Early-Onset 
Schizophrenia, 98 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI.S 11650 (2001). 
 240. Andreasen, supra note 89. 
 241. For instance, there have been finings that psychopaths have abnormal brain activity. See 
JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATH: EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 81-95 (2005) (reviewing brain-
imaging findings in psychopathy).  While the evidence is preliminary, there is some evidence 
suggesting that psychopaths have difficulty in emotion processing and impulsivity.  At first blush, I 
cannot see how this could led to criminal exculpation, but see Morse, supra note 67, at 264 
(discussing the necessity of emotional in moral and legal culpability). 
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that psychiatry should abandon any efforts to understand or even treat 
emotional difficulties, but claiming that “antisocial personality 
disorder”242 and schizophrenia243 are both “mental disorders” appears 
faulty and disingenuous. 
But does any of this matter?  It does in terms of giving psychiatric 
illnesses like schizophrenia their due recognition by medicine, 
philosophers, and the politicians.244  It also matters in terms of correcting 
the popular misconceptions about psychiatric illness and behavior.245  
Our culture has unconsciously assumed that many behaviors are caused 
by something awry in the brain.  This has led many into the belief that 
they are hopeless to overcome their biological propensities without the 
aid of professional mental health. But also it matters to the law; or to put 
it differently, it matters if one wants to prevent the perversion that 
science and law can visit upon each other.  The sections below will 
hopefully demonstrate that vice. 
A.  Disorder By Any Other Name 
The Fourth Edition of the DSM (DSM-IV)246 in 1994 and its “text 
revision” in 2000 (DSM-IV-TR),247 the current version, continued the 
new descriptive approach embraced by DSM-III.  Presently, the DSM 
contains 297 diagnoses in 886 pages.248  Thus, in the forty-two short 
years since its inception, the DSM diagnoses have ballooned by almost 
300% and the book itself has increased by 800% in length.  More 
importantly, however, is that the core mental illnesses that concerned 
Benjamin Rush’s seminal treatise – the severe mental illnesses: 
schizophrenia and manic-depression – are essentially the same.249  What 
 
 242. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 701. 
 243. Id. at 298. 
 244. There has been much written on whether mental health parity laws should be passed.  
Much of this issue hinges on whether mental illnesses are construed on par with physical diseases. 
See generally John K. Iglehart, The Mental Health Maze and the Call for Transformation, 350 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 507 (2004). 
 245. This can be seen mostly prominently in how our culture (aided by science) views 
addiction and sexual paraphilias. See, e.g., Molly M. Warthan, Tatsuo Uchida, & Richard F. 
Wagner, UV Light Tanning as a Type of Substance-Related Disorder, 141 ARCHIVES 
DERMATOLOGY 963 (2005); Lynne Lamberg, Researchers Seek Roots of Pedophilia, 294 J. AM. 
MED. ASS'N 546, 547 (2005) (describing research examining similarities between heroin addiction 
and pedophilia). 
 246. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
 247. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37. 
 248. Mayes & Horwitz, supra note 39, at 251. 
 249. See Compton, supra note 205, at 197-98. 
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has changed is the veritable explosion of disorders that have little 
connection with disease as traditionally understood or are not really 
biological in nature. In the present DSM there are a total of nine 
psychotic disorders.  Psychosis includes mental illnesses whereby a 
person loses contact with reality and often experiences periods of 
hallucinations and delusions.250  Schizophrenia is the most common 
psychotic disorder with a prevalence rate in the United States of about 
one percent of the general population.251 Compare this with the 
seventeen listed sexual disorders,252 which as discussed previously, have 
undergone a turbulent past. Included in this vast array of sexual 
disorders are: Exhibitionism, Pedophilia, Transvestic Fetishism, Gender 
Identity Disorder,253 and Sexual Sadism among others.  These disorders 
exist despite little to no empirical evidence of any underlying disease 
process that could account for their existence.254  Pedophilia, an immoral 
act, is a mental disorder not because of some mental degeneration of the 
brain but because such behavior is socially construed to be a process of a 
sick mind.255 Thus, it is a modern incantation of Pritchard’s moral 
insanity without the presumption of lack of self-governance (or negation 
of mens rea I suppose).256  One can surmise that in spite of biological 
psychiatry’s force during the past twenty-five years, sex and mental 
capacity are forever entwined. 
And what about the numerous personality disorders?  The DSM-III 
created an entirely new section for personality disorders that had not 
been included in previous editions.  Personality disorders are generally 
pervasive and insidious flaws of what has historically been conceived of 
as temperament, habit, or breeding.  Thus, the current edition of DSM 
contains a diagnosis of “antisocial personality disorder”257 that 
 
 250. See HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF 
PSYCHIATRY: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 492 (1998). 
 251. See DSM-IV supra note 246. 
 252. Kaplan, supra note 250, at 539-82. 
 253. There is much scientific and political debate about the biological role of gender.  Despite 
the paucity of definitive science on the matter, some view gender as a personal choice while the 
DSM says that it can be a mental disorder. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 576 with 
Patricia L. Brown, Supporting Boys or Girls When the Line Isn't Clear, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, 
at A1. 
 254. A cross-search in the PSYCHINFO database of the terms “pedophilia” and “biology” 
resulted in only four hits, none of which suggest a biological explanation; likewise, “neurobiology” 
and “paraphilias” produced seven with no biological explanations. American Psychological 
Association, APA PsycNET, http://psycnet.apa.org/ (last visited: Apr. 10, 2006). 
 255. See generally Richard Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder?, 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 467 (2002). 
 256. See PRICHARD, supra note 98. 
 257. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 701-06. 
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essentially defines a habitual rule-breaker as “mentally disordered” and 
presumably in need of psychiatric treatment (despite their being little, if 
any, successful treatment available).258  While personality features were 
considered relevant to pre-DSM-III clinicians, their elevation as a 
separate category of illness represented a “medicalization” of behavior 
that was previously considered inseparable from personal identity.259  
This seemingly slight change has a profound premise and conclusion.  If 
one’s predilection for asocial behavior is a mental disorder rather than 
the outcome of personal choice, then questions surrounding legal and 
social culpability are prominently introduced into the mix, but in a 
manner that is foreign to traditional criminal law.  The asocial behavior 
centers not on choice of the free agent who presumably could have been 
dissuaded by the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. Rather, the 
behavior is indicative of a diseased mind that requires a plethora of 
mental health interventions. The agent, moreover, is presumed to lack 
robust responsiveness to traditional criminal sanctions including 
deterrence and retribution, leaving only incapacitation.  While many 
scholars condemn retribution as an outmoded and harsh method of 
criminal justice, the de facto imprisonment of sex offenders under the 
numerous sexually violent predator statutes is accomplished under the 
incapacitation rubric.  But calculated incapacitation is a sword that cuts 
both ways. Incapacitation removes the moral condemnation in place of a 
diseased model, and hence, the proportionality of punishment is also 
replaced by a public safety model.  Of course, the question then 
becomes, would a sex offender ever be deemed safe enough for release 
into the community?  In this way, the transformation of immoral conduct 
into diseased behavior becomes dangerous since the morality of just 
punishment is silently removed in favor of a purely risk assessment 
process.  Yet as many scholars have demonstrated, humans are very poor 
at judging risk.260 
This is not to suggest that those who habitually engage in one 
behavior over another cannot gain insight from psychotherapy or that 
undesirable behavior is incapable of being changed through mental 
 
 258. See William H. Reid & Carl Gacono, Treatment of Antisocial Personality, Psychopathy, 
and other Characterological Antisocial Syndromes, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 647, 658 (2000) 
(concluding "[n]o traditional voluntary or inpatient milieu has been shown to be effective, and there 
is no individual or group psychotherapy that is routinely associated with success."). 
 259. See generally JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689) 
(discussing personal identity and consciousness). 
 260. See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 
136-75 (2002). 
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health programs.261  Rather, it is the crossing of the important but 
nebulous line between medical illness and personal identity that is 
troublesome.  By calling personality flaws illnesses, the role of personal 
choice and moral accountability are undermined.  Furthermore, in areas 
where science has not shown there to be any disease process causing the 
behavior, questions of normality become entirely socially constructed, 
and hence, venerable to manipulation by the politically powerful.  The 
term disorder is inherently meaningless since it has no scientific 
grounding.  Thus, psychiatry is free to subsume more behaviors under 
this confutable classification scheme which engenders the profession 
more power in culture and law.  The proliferation of mental disorders is 
an accretion of power with valence in every domain of life.  Under the 
nosology of mental disorder, there is little that cannot be deemed a 
psychiatric condition. 
Life is full of problems.  This is a truism of all people from all 
generations.  In dealing with emotional problems or brain diseases it is 
helpful to understand the problems that influence a person’s suffering.  
However, the DSM interjects a number of disorders or descriptors that 
are neither illnesses nor sicknesses. Illicit drug abuse is a horrendous 
social and political problem that destroys many families, neighborhoods, 
and a good deal of many fine people.  Taking drugs like cocaine 
undoubtedly changes the physiology of the brain,262 yet there is no 
disease because there is no pathogen.  The drug itself cannot be the 
pathogen because it is not a reproducing organism such as a virus or 
bacteria.  An animal that voluntarily and knowing ingests a drug that 
will harm itself cannot be suffering from a disease unless we are willing 
to claim that ill-advised, intentional behavior is the product of disease.  
A brain disease is so because of a presumed pathogenic process 
harmonious with established laws of science.263  Irrespective of whether 
such pathology is definitively identified, it leaves in its wake immutable 
signs of its presence, none of which includes a conscious undertaking by 
the host to induce more pathology. 
Likewise, when the DSM identifies numerous medical conditions 
under its purview that only tangentially relate to the brain, the questions 
 
 261. Indeed, I believe as a psychologist myself that many of life’s problems can be helped 
through psychotherapy.  But it is one think to say that one’s problems or penchants could benefit 
from therapy and quite another to say or imply that they are mental diseases. 
 262. See generally B. Jill Venton et. al., Cocaine Increases Dopamine Release by Mobilization 
of Synapsin-Dependant Reverse Pool, 26 THE J. NEUROSCIENCE 3206 (2006). 
 263. See generally Koch, supra note 227; Sally Satel & Scott Lilienfeld, Medical Misnomer: 
Addiction Isn’t A Brain Disease, SLATE, July 25, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2171131/. 
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begs: what purpose does this serve?  Thus, the “mental disorder” of 
“Breathing-Related Sleep Disorder”264 (otherwise known as sleep apnea) 
or “Sexual Dysfunction Due to a Medical Condition”265 are illegitimate 
to psychiatry not because they are inconsequential to the emotions or 
functioning of a person, but because they are neither brain diseases nor 
principally curative under psychiatric practice.266  Similarly, 
“Hypoactive Sexual Desire Disorder”267 is fraudulent because by failing 
to identify its medical origin, psychiatry inculcates a mental singularity 
when in fact it is apt to be entirely biological.  Such methods serve only 
to confabulate sickness with mental phenomena by placing life’s 
problems and aspects of medical diseases into a fictional mental domain 
that ostensibly is the exclusive authority of psychiatry. 
B.  A Road to Perdition 
As is probably clear in this Article, Freud’s influence in psychiatry 
and its classification of mental illnesses had many profound effects 
during the 1940s through the 1970s.  As was discussed in Part I and Part 
II, what was curious and disturbing was that Freud’s ideas were largely 
theoretical in a field that represented itself as science.  As such, 
psychiatric thought was asserted instead of proven.  Nonetheless, there is 
something to be said about a theoretical outlook on behavior.  When the 
DSM-III was published, there was much outcry from the psychoanalysts 
who contested the deletion of “neurosis” from the diagnostic manual.268  
The DSM-II was essentially divided between psychotic illnesses and the 
neuroses.269  Neurosis was conceived by Freud and psychoanalysts as an 
imbalance in the mind due to the conflict between the id and superego 
that the ego tried to resolve through various defense mechanisms, but 
wherein rational thought was preserved.270  There are many problems 
with this notion of mind, the first of which is that who is to say that there 
is anything such as the id, ego, or superego?  Notwithstanding, the 
benefit of this view in the DSM-II was a sense that not all mental 
 
 264. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 622. 
 265. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 558-61. 
 266. For instance, a pituitary adenoma could produce sexual dysfunction, but psychiatrists do 
not treat this illness, endocrinologists do. See EUGENE BRAUNWALD ET AL., HARRISON'S 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2033 (15th ed. 2001). 
 267. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 37, at 539. 
 268. See Ronald Bayer & Robert L. Spitzer, Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III. A 
History of Controversy, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187 (1985). 
 269. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR 
MENTAL DISORDERS  (2nd ed. 1968). 
 270. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 9 (1923). 
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problems were the same.  That is, there were the psychoses which were 
thought of as severe breaks of the mind from reality and then there were 
the neuroses which were, in many ways, life’s problems.  Thus, it was a 
common view among the Freudians that all people encountered neurosis 
sometime in their lives and that part of life’s work was to toil through 
them.271  In departing from this idea, the DSM-III essentially 
transformed all behaviors in the diagnostic manual into illnesses.  In so 
doing, they not only changed social perception of personality flaws from 
difficulties to illness, but also changed how institutions used these 
epistemological views. 
It has often been said that what makes law different is the force of 
law.272  Law is in a unique position to back up its assertions with 
sanctions.  Thus, when the law borrows ideas from other disciplines, it 
has the capability to enforce those ideas throughout society.  Moreover, 
law does not necessarily need to follow a pursuit of truth in the same 
manner that science does.  In that vein, law has more to do with politics 
and seeking those ends than with conceptual validity.  That is, justice is 
determined by what political actors decree it is, not by some lofty quest 
to resolve theory and practice. In terms of behavior, the expansion of 
“madness”273 into the pantheon of the current DSM has epitomized this 
danger of the interplay between law and psychiatry.  
As an illustrative example, take the antisocial personality disorder. 
In Foucha v. Louisiana,274 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
state could not involuntarily hold a psychiatric patient adjudicated not 
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) who no longer is suffering from a 
mental illness. Mr. Foucha’s retention was sought because although he 
was no longer psychotic, his future dangerousness was uncertain because 
of his antisocial traits.  The Court held that such detention was unlawful 
because Foucha was no longer mentally ill and dangerous.275  Citing its 
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson,276 the Court noted that mental 
illness is required for involuntary psychiatric commitment.277  Since 
Foucha’s antisocial traits were not an official diagnosis, his detention 
was predicated on possible future dangerousness.278  In contrast, in U.S. 
 
 271. See OTTO FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL THEORY OF NEUROSIS (1999). 
 272. See MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919). 
 273. See Blackstone, supra note 22, and accompanying text. 
 274. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992). 
 275. Id. 
 276. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 277. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77. 
 278. Id. at 78. 
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v. Jackson,279 the Fifth Circuit held it permissible to continue the 
commitment of an NGRI whose schizophrenia was in remission because 
his diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder rendered him 
dangerous.280  Likewise, in a North Carolina case, the Court of Appeals 
for Northern Carolina upheld the continued confinement of an NGRI 
patient with a history of a brief psychotic episode, substance abuse, and 
antisocial “traits.”281  Drawing upon the inclusion of personality 
disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
as well as expert testimony that such disorders are lifelong afflictions, 
the Court held that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous within 
the ambit of the statute.282  And there is, of course, the well-known 
Kansas v. Hendricks283 case whereby the United States Supreme Court 
held that there was no violation of Hendricks’s Constitutional rights 
when Kansas committed him for psychiatric treatment for pedophilia 
after his serving his criminal sentence.  What can we deduce from these 
apparently incongruous results?  Much has been written about the 
Hendricks case and I will not delve into the many legal controversies 
surrounding that case in this article.  What I think is relevant, though, for 
this article is that while many mental health professionals have decried 
the Hendricks case, it was inevitable because the legacy of the DSM and 
psychiatry has been to subsume more and more behaviors under the 
broad rubric of “mental disorder.”  It is true that sexual psychopaths 
have routinely been civilly committed in the country,284 but in an age of 
biological psychiatry the inclusion of pedophilia or the myriad of other 
“disorders” that have absolutely no foundation in a biologically-rooted, 
disease model discipline is a road that invites treachery.  The law should 
not so blatantly abuse science to achieve politically desired, albeit 
understandable, results (in this case lifelong incapacitation).  Likewise, 
psychiatry should not engage in such falsehoods as much of the DSM 
does. 
 
 279. U.S. v. Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 280. Id. at 1007 (upholding the district court’s finding of dangerousness “because the evidence 
shows that his current dangerousness stems from an antisocial personality rather than schizophrenia 
and that he can be held legally only if his violent behavior is ‘due to a present mental disease or 
defect’.”). 
 281. In re Hayes, 532 S.E.2d 553 (2000). 
 282. “[A]ssuming arguendo that Hayes is neither psychotic nor drug or alcohol dependent, he 
may still be found ‘mentally ill’ by virtue of having been diagnosed with a personality disorder.” Id. 
at 558. 
 283. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 284. See Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
543 (1950). 
53
Erickson: Myth of Mental Disorder
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
ERICKSON_FINAL 1/25/2008  10:30:55 AM 
120 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:67 
IV. CONCLUSION: REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA 
As I have presented, there is much to be concerned about the road 
that psychiatry is on.  This is no mere intellectual debate for mental 
health professionals since how behavior is explained and excused has 
profound social and legal consequences.  Herbert Fingarette’s prescient 
conclusion in his Yale Law Journal article thirty years ago that legal 
conclusions regarding behavior are quite apart from social or humane 
ones was an astute observation.285  The reform that the DSM needs must 
begin with an honest self-evaluation by psychiatry.  If it is a science, 
then it must embrace the scientific principles and diagnose illnesses by 
virtue of their characteristics as disease.  While it is an axiom that 
behavior and mental illness are different than say, cancer, insofar as it 
deals with the realm of the mind, Szasz and others are disingenuous 
when they suggest that mental illness is a myth because the mental and 
physical are patently different entities.  Much folly can come of going 
down such a road – namely, who am I? A mind or brain that types these 
letters on this page? This is a solipsist fallacy that never ends.  There are 
indeed many mental illnesses and while the science may leave us 
disappointed, the exercise of any scientific exploration is the gathering 
of evidence and deducing a conclusion.  I think that for “madness” as 
Blackstone viewed it, the evidence is sufficient. 
Science survives socially by its legitimacy, much like all social 
institutions.  As such, if the aim of psychiatry is the benefice of people 
with mental illnesses, it behooves the discipline to wisely consider how 
history will account of it.  Mental disorder is a myth because it is 
nescient – a term ripe for manipulation and diminutive of science. But 
since this term provides a tacit method of expanding its influence as the 
arbiters of behavior, I fear it will survive.  In many ways, however, 
psychiatry cannot be blamed. In attempting to understand the 
metaphysical mind, psychiatry is not like physics, chemistry, or even 
law.  That is, it cannot operate solely in the physical world, since the 
ultimate objective is an understanding of the human experience.  
Likewise, as a scientific endeavor, it operates in a political world that 
vigorously resists evidence that challenges the orthodoxy.  Law is an 
orthodoxy that demands explanations which conform to its ontological 
view, and there are few institutions more powerful than law.  
Consequently, psychiatry is left with the dubious task of adapting its 
understanding of behavior to a culture and institution that demands 
 
 285. See Fingarette, supra note 197, at 443-44. 
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acceptance of its ideological framework.  Humility, as the founder of 
psychiatry Benjamin Rush opined nearly 200 years ago, is the first and 
last step in understanding the astonishing operations of the mind. 
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